

Anglican Theological Review

EDITED BY

FREDERICK C. GRANT AND BURTON S. EASTON

Founded by SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

VOLUME XXI

OCTOBER, 1939

NUMBER 4

THE CHRISTIAN FAITH AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

By W. NORMAN PITTENGER, General Theological Seminary

We are concerned in this paper with the way in which the modern philosophical and scientific thinker envisages the universe and man, and with the position which the Christian religion can hold in such a world. We shall first of all consider the scientific situation; then the more general philosophical point of view; and finally, the relation of Christianity to the world which these two present.

I

A survey of current scientific thought must necessarily be brief. We have no time to outline in any detail the many new developments in this field—and for such a purpose, we may suggest the University of Chicago lectures published under the title, *The Nature of the World and Man*, or the brief treatment in A. C. Bouquet's *The World We Live In*.

Yet a few important facts, taken more or less at random from the several sciences, will be of significance in giving the general line of approach. The distance of the earth from the sun is ninety-three million miles, and the mass of the sun is three hundred and thirty thousand times that of the earth, while its

diameter is eight hundred and sixty-four thousand miles as contrasted with our earth's four thousand miles. The nearest star is at two hundred and seventy-five thousand times the distance of our sun, or 4.3 light years; and the giant Betelgeuse, with a diameter three hundred times that of our sun, is two hundred and ten light years away from us. Man's *physical* significance in this scheme is quite plain.

But on the other hand, the newer physics has now demonstrated that the substratum of the world is made up of electrical charges, the exact nature of which is quite uncertain, but which are governed (as some think) by a principle of indeterminacy that introduces an element of "super-controlled" chance into the very heart of things. Certainly this does not establish freedom of the will; but on the other hand, it is a startling reversal of the deterministic position necessitated by the classical Newtonian physics. The universe would appear to be finite; and space to be curved, so that the nearest star may be only the other side of the farthest star—or at least, so some of the latest developments of astro-physics are thought to indicate. The principle of relativity has quite turned our ideas of the physical world upside down.

The application of the theory of development or evolution, extended into the physical sphere, has shown us a cosmic workshop in which universes and their member planets are made and unmade with terrific violence, seemingly without rhyme or reason. And the ultimate constituents of these universes are infinitesimal electrical charges evidently more or less unpredictable in their individual movement or variation. From one of the giant universe-collisions, our own world may date its appearance. Taken into the biological realm, this same general theory of change, today accepted by every competent authority, shows huge movement in organic life, with a process of ordered development going on from the first protoplasm up to the more than two hundred and fifty thousand species of backboneless animals and some twenty-five thousand species of vertebrate animals. There has been a gradual advance, over millions of years, both in integra-

tion and differentiation, in the direction of ever-higher forms of life. And a continuous natural process of change has been taking place, along the definite direction of the appearance of new individuals, developing qualities implicit in the originative stock.

In another direction, psychology has altered our notion of life. The presence of the behaviouristic, dynamic, psychoanalytic and Gestalt schools, each with its own peculiar theories and principles, is indicative of the confusion in this particular field; but it is probable that some unified psychology may emerge within a short time; and in the meanwhile, it is clear that the present line tends to assert that the mental life of the higher animals, and of man, is part of an organic whole which includes mechanical stimulus-reaction chains as well as the deterministic realm of the subconscious, but in itself is more than these and is capable of using them in a manner roughly called purposive.

Finally, physiological research, anthropology, and sociology have altered our conception of man's history; and we know more of the very primitive origin of his social, æsthetic, religious, and even his scientific ideas, and see something of the principles which have governed their growth. The perspective has altered tremendously; and man is placed in a long line of development, both in body and mind, and is seen against the background of a natural world of which he is, in some quite real and definite sense, a constituent part.

But despite this startling expansion of the scientific outlook in recent years, all of us are aware that at the same time a profound change has come over scientific theorizing since the halcyon days of the great naturalists of the last century. No longer do our best scientists hold with certainty that their studies will eventually enable them to give an exhaustive account of the entire world in purely mechanical terms. They have come to see that there are more things in the world than science can account for, although they are as insistent as ever upon the necessity of pushing the mechanistic explanation as far as it will go.

There are art, poetry, friendship, truth, moral standards, religious experience; and all of these, in the last analysis, elude

the scientific experimentalist. Undoubtedly science has something to say about each one of them. In the final reckoning, however, they are *sui generis*; they cannot be explained by strict science, since they do not fall within the area of that which is susceptible of measurement, dissection, or mathematical statement in terms of equations.

We need not agree with all that Eddington, Jeans, Planck, Bavinck and Schrödinger have said in recent books, to see the importance of their disinterested admission that science is not the whole story, and that other realms of human experience have a genuine contribution to make to our understanding of this world in which our lives are set. With all their epistemological vagaries, these scientists' writings have real value because they show a widespread revolt, among scientists themselves, against a purely naturalistic explanation of the universe.

To a large degree, this has been the result of an astonishing change in the conception of the nature and function of science itself. Distinguished French writers on scientific theory, such as Meyerson, Poincaré, Duhem and LeRoy, were among the first to insist that so-called scientific laws may not properly be regarded as rigid cast-iron definitions, deterministic in nature and involving the mechanistic outlook which saw the entire world as a vast mindless machine. The French theorists, now joined by many English and German scientists, affirm on the contrary that the laws of science are in reality convenient working hypotheses, or statistical averages, or summaries of observed sequences, which are all indispensable in the furtherance of research, but which must always remain open to qualification and correction in the light of new facts obtained by fresh and more careful observation; and that they may well undergo continual expansion and development.

In his contribution to a discussion of the nature of science conducted several years ago in a French periodical, M. Émile Picard stated the view of many modern scientists: "Our scientific theories follow one another with a rapidity that is sometimes alarming, and take on an increasingly schematic and symbolic

colouring. The history of the sciences is full of failures: theories, like books, have their day. Our conception of natural law has changed amazingly in fifty years. Thus the quantum theory has come to modify our ideas on continuity. Again the calculus is taking an important part in physics, so that the laws of nature appear as no more than probable and have lost the rigidity which they had for our predecessors. Those who make a fetish of science can be left to their dogmatism. Science, as Montaigne has said, is a fine adornment of the mind and a wonderfully useful implement; but we must realize its limitations, and not deceive ourselves about what we can expect from it."

It should be realized, however, that this recognition of the limits to which science is bound does not in any sense invalidate the use of mechanistic concepts and methods in scientific investigation, nor the legitimacy of the scientific insistence that such mechanistic ideas must be pressed to their utmost point. What it does make clear is that while the extent of mechanism in the universe is much larger than we might have anticipated, it is also true that it is *relatively* unimportant. This was said long ago by Lotze; and its truth is being realized anew today—that science gives us a mechanistic view, but that the mechanistic view does not go all the way. Measurement, analysis, classification, genetic studies, and the rest of scientific procedure are of vast importance; but they do not exhaust the experience of man.

We see, then, that many contemporary scientists say that when it comes to taking long views of man's experience and of the universe as a whole, synthesis and the faculty of appreciation, and the data discovered in other than scientific realms, must all be called in to assist the thinker. Science has immeasurably increased our conception of the size and age of our world; the new vistas are breath-taking, the reach vaster than our mind can grasp. Science has taught us of our animal descent, traced our racial history, shown us the origin of our institutions and customs, found strange areas in our minds, discovered mechanical reactions which within limits contribute to explain our activity. All of this must find its place in our completed outlook on man and

the world. But on the other hand, science has found for itself that it cannot solve the riddle of the universe, and least of all produce the fruits of the spirit or provide motives for unselfish endeavour.

This change in scientific outlook has been followed in some quarters by a profound scepticism. The human mind can no longer be trusted, it is said; science, which was thought to be universal truth, is a "false messiah" and its findings as much wishful thinking as anything else in human experience. Science has been shown up as an impostor. Still others have taken refuge in irrational divisions of human experience; they have denied that there is a principle of unity in our knowledge, and would say that the disjointed (and to them contradictory) results of science, art, morality, and perhaps even religion must all be taken as of equal truth or falsehood, as our preferences incline, or as pragmatic sanctions impel us.

Here there are questions to ask. Is there not good reason for trusting the human mind and rational powers? Admittedly they cannot give us all the truth, but may they not give us some partial and real truth? How can we operate scientifically, or even pragmatically, without some principle of unity which explains the world and all things in it as being of a piece, open to our quest and giving us valid information? The sceptical or the ultimately dualistic tendency in scientific thought may well lead to intellectual suicide; here science needs new faith in itself and its methods.

Many great scientists do not share these needlessly extreme views. They do not hesitate to affirm that science has real truth to give; and that it is complementary to, and not contradictory of, the findings of other departments of human experience and thought. Indeed, they concur with religious faith in declaring that in man's mental, æsthetic, and moral life, and in his spiritual aspirations, we have our profoundest insight into the nature of Reality; and they would go on to say that science, religion, and other avenues of approach to that Reality are all valid in their way, and will in the end be found to be fitted into one total scheme.

Some observations remain to be made on the general question of the relation of religion and science. God cannot be proved from science: all science will show is some sort of characterless creative power or cosmic force. But despite man's physical insignificance in the scheme of things, he has a central place in our understanding of the world, just so soon as what may loosely be called the qualitative aspect of experience is given its proper recognition. In this way the newer scientists (as Dr F. R. Tennant has suggested) have reinstated man in something like the position which he held before the Copernican revolution. The very fact that man has discovered important scientific data about the physical universe makes it impossible to regard him merely as animal or machine; his insight, intuition, inferences, impressions, and apprehensions are valuable and indeed central to our understanding of the world.

If science cannot give a complete account of man and of the world, there is room for all of the other avenues of approach, notably religion. We did not need to wait for Sir Arthur Eddington to tell us that we might believe in God; science itself could not proceed without a faith in Reality and in truth which amounts to an implicit faith in what religion explicitly calls God. Yet it has been an important aid to religion to have famous scientists confess that apart from religious faith and experience they can see no solution to the problem of the world and its meaning. Modern science is very much humbler than was that of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Dr Bouquet has pointed out, it has nothing to say against and much to say for the self-existent, self-expressive Whole whom faith calls God. But religion, for its part, has no right whatever to deny full scientific investigation of all data, nor can it attempt to force antiquated or inaccurate science on its believers. Certainly we have come to see that generosity is needed on both sides.

Within the world which science observers—that is, the whole field of phenomena—miracle in the sense of catastrophic intrusion from outside into the ordered operation of the physical universe is an inadmissible hypothesis. This may be *a priori*; but it is an

essential to the scientist, who today would assert that while we know nothing about "laws" which never may be broken, we do know a great deal about regularities which as a matter of observed fact never are broken. Here is no denial of new truth, new facts, unexpected data; but an insistence upon orderliness and sequence which alone makes consistent study possible. And from the point of view of religion, we may add that a faith which rests upon arbitrary interventions into a world which otherwise gets on quite nicely without the assistance of the Deity can never endure.

On the other hand, science has nothing to say against the view of the Supernatural held by Baron von Hügel and other great contemporary religious writers, who regard it (in Dr Dakin's words) as "the rational and spiritual values and realities inherent in the structure of nature, and also God himself not only in his immanence but also in his transcendence." God and the Supernatural need not be sought in the gaps of our knowledge—that is, in those places where we do not yet understand the causal nexus; nor is he to be found only in what appear to be catastrophic intrusions into an ordered world. There are vast differences and unprecedented and unpredictable emergences and changes in the process of evolution, but these are always in the end found to be related to an congruous with the systematic line of activity, occurring within a greater continuity as part of the operation of the Reality in and behind the whole grand order, when this is taken with full recognition of its heights, depths, and varied levels.

But, we may be asked, does not psychological investigation show that religious experience, and *a fortiori* religion itself, is mere illusion? On the contrary, it should be pointed out that such investigation when properly carried out has nothing whatever to say about validity. Science is not concerned with ultimates; and the psychologists who deny the trans-subjective reference of religious experience in the widest sense of that term do so so on the basis of their own naturalistic philosophy and not as a result of strictly scientific study. In his recent *Religion*

and Theism, Professor Webb has brilliantly shown that the effort to account for this experience without invoking some more-than-human Reality is bound to lead nowhere. Not only does it fail to account for the note of ultimacy in that experience, and so destroy its characteristic quality, but it also deposes scientific experience itself, since on precisely the same grounds that can be shown to be illusory.

The conclusion of the sober philosophical psychologists may be put in words of Dr Bouquet, who writes that religious experience on the one hand is not miraculous, meaning a strange unrelated intervention into supposedly purely human experience, and on the other hand it is not an illusion; it is "a penetration of the finite and partially spontaneous by that which brought it into being . . . the reinforcement and heightening of a life already there by a fresh current of life from the Original Source." Religious experience is therefore a point at which there is a unique release of trans-human energy into human affairs; and it is this which explains its stupendous results in the world of men.

Religion, if it minds its own business, has nothing to fear from science; nor has science anything to fear from religion. Science acts as a purifying agent, cleansing away mythological ideas and the false science which has accumulated about religious faith, and making that faith stronger and better able to inspire men. As Dr Manross has remarked in a recent essay, there is "a growing recognition that the scientific method, however important its contributions to human knowledge, cannot, because of its essentially empirical character, provide that unified view of human life and human aims which is essential to worthy living." Yet it must always be remembered that science is not merely a valuable method of study and an important aid in practical affairs; it is also, to quote again from Dr Manross, "a deeply religious form of asceticism," because of its "rigorous subjection of the investigator's wishes to the demands of reason and carefully observed experience."

II

Let us now turn to philosophy.

There are many types of system offered today in the name of modern thought, and they are vastly different one from another. But it is fair to say that there is a significant trend in modern philosophy, quite generally accepted even though it is perhaps most explicitly stated by certain writers whom we shall mention. In a recent work of rather "popular" philosophy, for example, C. Delisle Burns differs quite violently from many other modern thinkers; yet his orientation is in the main that which characterizes the majority of outstanding writers and which we shall describe in a moment. It cannot correctly be said of modern philosophy as it is said of modern psychology—that there is no such thing, only individual opinions.

There is today a dominant orientation towards the world, which may aptly be described as (a) emergent, (b) holistic, and (c) evolutionary. We shall take these points in their reverse order.

First, the modern thinker sees the world as process or as evolutionary movement. He may not regard this as an exhaustive statement, but he accepts the fact. For the first time in the history of human thought, lay-folk and philosophers have come to regard the universe as in flux. This profound alteration in our thinking is comparatively recent. Many adumbrations of evolutionary philosophy are to be found before 1859, when Charles Darwin published *The Origin of Species*; Heracleitus saw the universe in movement, and even St Augustine was familiar with the notion of development in the natural world. But it was from Darwin's work, and the reflection of the biological theory of evolution in more extended fields, that the new outlook came into general view. We all realize, we all assume, that we live in a world where change has been going on for untold millions of years, with gigantic alterations in the physical structure of things long before life came, and with it the appearance of new species, and indeed with constant movement.

The second factor is a strong emphasis on emergence—that is, on the appearance of quite new strata and types in the process of evolution. No longer is it maintained by respectable philosophers that the history of the world is simply the story of the automatic rearrangement of what was there all the time. The evolution of the universe is not the hapless result of a fortuitous concourse of atoms, nor is it the simple appearance of alteration in what is really a dead world of mechanical “parts.” The whole movement is characterized by creativity; there is genuine development and growth. We have been led to see that along with the continuity of process which evolution indicates, there is also the appearance of real and unpredictable differences. These cannot be termed mere resultants of the combination of constituent parts, for they are quite new, both in quality and function. Yet, so far as can be discovered, there has been no intrusion from outside the process; all we know is that there may have been partial realizations of the new, but that when conditions are ripe there actually *comes to pass* a new level in the process. We cannot say what makes the change, nor just when it occurs; the movement is both gradual and sudden. There the new thing is—and that is the fact to be accounted for.

Oxygen and hydrogen do not combine to produce a resultant which contains three atoms and which might satisfactorily be called oxygen-plus-hydrogen, with functions and qualities merely additive of the two. They combine to produce a new emergent, the qualitatively different thing H_2O , which does have two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen combined to make three atoms, but which is something quite other than oxygen-plus-hydrogen. Water cannot be explained without remainder in terms of its original chemical constituents, for it is *something* itself. From the union of oxygen and hydrogen has evolved, emergently—that is, as a new appearance—something which has its own specific characteristics. Furthermore, this new thing indicates the latent nature of the elements of which it is composed. Thus we know that hydrogen and oxygen, when combined as water, have

certain functions and qualities which they did not have as simple elements.

This type of interpretation, when carried through the whole evolutionary process, involves a view of the world as a graded system of emergents, in which more of the underlying nature of the movement is disclosed in the higher and more richly complex sectors than in the lower or less fully differentiated levels. The process is to be judged by its end rather than its beginning. What is the explanation of these new emergents? Why do they appear when they appear?

From these considerations, philosophers have come to another now quite generally accepted position which we have called "holistic." The world-process is an organic one, for many modern thinkers; each entity in this emergent universe is *more* than the sum of its parts, as Wundt used to say of "psychological wholes." And the unity which is observed in any entity and in the whole process is a unity as a real "whole"; it is holistic. The whole is in each case characterized by its own specific qualities and functions, and is explicable (insofar as it is explicable at all) only in terms of its *drive*, its end, or the goal towards which it strives, whether that striving be conscious or vitalistic or merely the seeking of the perfection of the entity on some other level.

The constituent parts are taken up into the larger activity of the next "whole" which includes them; and when taken up into that level derive therefrom a new or altered functional nature, which is the result of their sharing in the new configuration. They are organic in being united in some transcendent purposive mode towards the achievement of an end or object. In this manner, the conception of mechanism, although true on the lower level and in one aspect, is subsumed in a larger teleology.

Modern philosophy tends to see the whole world-system as an emergent series of organisms, some small and some great, some less and some more richly differentiated. The series starts from the abstraction of space-time, and mounts through matter (which Whitehead regards as composed of tiny organisms such as atoms

and molecules) to life (both vegetative and animal), intelligence or personality, spirit and value-apprehension; and finally, as for S. Alexander, to a level which he calls "emergent deity"—not yet here but ahead of us and suggested in religious experience. There are possible sub-divisions of these several grades, and the process is by no means neat and uniform in development; but the scheme is generally accepted as an accurate description of the situation.

Here again, there are questions. Is such a process self-explanatory? What is the nature of the teleology which seems involved in it? What does the fact of organism suggest as to the nature of the whole?

Some thinkers hold that there is an unconscious will or *nîsus* which is directive of the whole course of events; others, discerning the contradiction in the conception of unconscious will, assert that this purpose is a stream of consciousness, and some will affirm an immanent deity whose purpose is realized in the world. Some hold, but not too securely, to an old-fashioned naturalism. But even the dialectic materialists are unable to maintain this view with any great ease.

By and large, it is believed that the evolutionary movement shows signs of following a direction, and it would be pretty generally agreed that the direction is most clearly manifested in man and his grasp of values. Events and levels in the process are unique, providing a special insight, and in their degree a permanent insight, as they reach higher grades of differentiation and integration, into the nature of the whole. History is of special significance; it is a process which manifests something vital to the nature of the world, and is not to be dissociated from the natural order in which it occurs. Indeed, among some philosophers, it is given an almost absolute place; it, and it alone, is significant—so Croce and followers of his school of neo-Hegelianism, and so likewise the philosophers of the Marxian school. In events, in facts, in the occurrences of history, in the lives of men with their apprehension of value, their purposes and their ideal strivings, there is no mere adventitious happening,

but an actual emergent in the order of the universe, declaring something about that from which they emerge.

Physically, quantitatively, the significance of man and his history appears slight; qualitatively he has a real centrality to our understanding of things. On the biological—and on the natural—level he is organic to the world which produced him; and his ideals, his moral, æsthetic, scientific, and religious experience, are part of his very being. If he is so intimately related to the scheme of things, that scheme cannot be explained without taking him into account; nor can it be understood without attention to the events, facts, trends, and historical development which is part of human life on this planet. Human personality, with its history and with its insight into its history, is felt by many philosophers to be the highest level in the cosmic process (so far as we have knowledge), and as a real emergent to demand a spiritual environment of a sort adequate both for its own explanation and for its own expression.

In the light of these new tendencies in philosophy, an epistemology of a realistic sort seems demanded. No longer can man's experience be cut off from the world by some ultimate dualism. He and his world are organic, his experience is a real experience, and his "ideologies" are the result of the impact of that world upon him. In the writings of Dr William Temple and others, a new emphasis has been made upon this important fact; and the way seems prepared for a bringing-together of idealism and realism in a synthesis which will place man once again at the heart of things, and not abstract him from Reality as if he were a biological "sport."

A few remarks on individual philosophers may be of use at this point. M. Bergson was among the first to protest against a purely mechanistic explanation of the evolutionary process. His view of life as *élan vital* which overcomes sheer necessity and springs forth in rich creativity in the ever-changing forms of our world, was extraordinarily valuable at the turn of the century in showing the inadequacy of nineteenth century philosophical conceptions. We may feel his theory inadequate

—and it is interesting to see that in his more recent works (as in *Les Deux Sources*) he identifies the *élan vital* with the immanent action of a creative God. But his defense of creativity, freedom, novelty, as far back as the early part of this century, was a very great service indeed.

Professor Alexander, in his Gifford Lectures, *Space, Time, and Deity*, proposes an evolutionary philosophy which accepts new emergents "with natural piety," insisting on the inadequacy of the mechanistic interpretation and urging that the universe is a graded epigenetic system from space-time up to deity. Just what is the point of origin of the whole process is uncertain; it is not deity, for to Alexander deity seems to be always an ideal—the universe is pregnant with deity never quite born, as it were a realm of ideality which attaches to and beckons the existent world on to ever higher levels. Such a view is hardly adequate to the demands of reason and the reality of religious life; but the forward-look, the freedom, and the creativity of the world as portrayed by Alexander are surely important to emphasize.

Alexander's metaphysic is taken over, but with very significant changes, by Professor Lloyd-Morgan in his Gifford Lectures, *Emergent Evolution* and *Life, Mind, and Spirit*. Here we have a graded universe of matter, life, mind, and spirit, with a conscious *nisus* identified by Lloyd-Morgan with the Divine Logos. The element of transcendence seems to be overlooked in this scheme, which is somewhat Spinozistic in outlook; but the Christian character of the philosopher's thought is made clear when he writes that it is his belief that the immanent Logos is uniquely self-expressed in the person of Jesus Christ. Deity is for Lloyd-Morgan operative throughout the whole grand system of nature, evoking the successive levels, self-expressed in them, and specially manifest in Christ. This noble conception is readily available for Christian use, and has been employed to good effect by Fr Lionel Thornton (in *The Incarnate Lord*), by the Archbishop of York, and by the Dean of St Paul's.

Mention should be made of the work of General Smuts, chiefly in his volume entitled *Holism*. Here again the world is an

emergent process, whose explanation is in its whole-making character—the fact that it is marked by a tendency to produce ever more inclusive organisms. No transcendent explanatory principle is invoked; the universe itself is seen as a totality, a super-organism whose whole character is explained by itself. This is hardly satisfactory; and Professor Whitehead, whose views are similar to Smuts', finds an explanatory "principle of concretion" a necessity. This principle evokes from the realm of unlimited ideal possibility or potentiality that which becomes actual or concreted in the particular "events" of the world. Whitehead is probably the greatest of living philosophers, and his scheme is among the most impressive ever presented to man. Whether it can in itself be regarded as complete and satisfactory without a more adequate view of the relation of "creativity," the principle of "concretion," and the realm of "ideal possibility," is a question which now engages the attention of many thinkers.

Along somewhat similar lines we find Professor Hocking speaking of "a principle of wholes," Dr Stout writing of the organic nature of mind-body, Dr Michael Pupin insisting on "creative coordination," and Professor Wieman of "a principle of integration." And Dr Odgen, in translating Koffka's study, *The Growth of Mind*, gives an excellent phrase for the understanding of this organic view. He speaks of "a system of energy in which every part cooperates in determining the whole, and the whole in determining every part," and adds that this cooperation takes place in view of some purposive object, whether consciously or unconsciously grasped.

Nearly all of the writers whom we have mentioned are sympathetic to moral, æsthetic, and religious experience. They feel that such experience gives real insight into the nature of the world; they believe that it is no mere illusion to say that there are other than scientific avenues of approach to Reality. They would agree that in all of his many ways of knowledge and life, man is put into contact with some genuine Reality; they differ among themselves as to the nature of that Reality, and its relationship to man. Probably none of the systems which we have briefly

sketched is satisfactory for the Christian as giving a full account of the universe—that is, of God and his relation to the world, and especially to that prior action of God in and upon his world which is the heart of religion's insistent faith. But Christianity must somehow be set in the context of this new world-outlook. When this is done, Christianity by reason of its own specific data will be able to supplement the modern as it has the ancient philosophies of men.

III

It is in such a scientific and philosophical milieu, then, that Christianity must deliver its message. In a vastly expanded universe, spatially and temporally, but with due allowance made for the importance of moral, æsthetic, and religious life as well as for scientific experimentation, the Christian faith is to be shown as the adequate interpretation of the world, man, and his experience.

Fundamentally, Christian theology must maintain the need for a transcendent principle of explanation. The immanent process of the scientific theorists and the philosophers must be seen as the operation of a Reality which is more than that process. Here is a solution to the problem of an evolving universe. A world in which there is nothing but change is an inexplicable world. The process of development is in itself no more an explanation than the earlier naturalistic conception of the unmeaning re-arrangement of material particles. Nor will the notion of an unconscious purpose or will, or a vitalistic stream of tendency, give an adequate answer; all of these are self-contradictory or incomplete, and themselves are in need of explanation.

For undifferentiated immanentism or sheer pantheism, Christian philosophy would substitute the notion of an ultimate Reality operating in but inexhaustibly more than all things. That Reality is the unchanging ground of change; and the evolutionary movement itself is the working-out of some great purpose involved in that Reality. The fuller expression of that creative purpose ex-

plains the emergence of new levels in the process, each being in its degree revelatory of some aspect of the underlying activity and transcendent source. The world can never explain God; it can give us hints as to his nature and "plan." On the other hand, only a God who is in himself above (although intimately concerned with) the changing fortunes of process, can offer any adequate explanation of the actual course of events.

Any sheer immanentism does away with the fact of God as an unexhausted and distinct Reality, and appears to remove all moral standards by making every level equally indicative of his being and purpose. Yet two plain facts of experience are the sense of the other and the holy, the ultimate and the sacred, and the presence of moral distinctions in our daily life. In the conception of God which Christian thought suggests, the reality of God's distinct being is safeguarded, and ethical distinctions are preserved. That mysterious and transcendental reach of human experience of which we have spoken is validated; and a principle of unity is secured which can give meaning to the many areas of human life and make clear that scientific, æsthetic, moral, and religious experience are real apprehensions of Reality, and in the long-run complementary and not contradictory lines of knowledge and activity.

Christianity, then, may be offered as the most adequate, fertile, and deeply rewarding interpretation of Reality, the universe, and man. But it is not only an interpretation; it is the power to live nobly and well in the midst of this present world. The way is open for a presentation of the Christian religion as the soul's nearest approach to God; an approach which Christianity itself affirms takes men to the heart of God only because God has first deigned to draw near to men. And we may note that this Christian emphasis on the divine priority is in line with the empirical facts of the given-ness of life, the self-existence of Reality apart from man, and the resultant response of man to the ever-continuing impact of the more-than-human and the other-than-human upon him. That can only be explained, it asserts, by the en-

visaging of Reality as in constant penetrating action upon his world, a world created and sustained by him and open at every point to his ceaseless operation.

By placing Jesus Christ, seen as the uniquely full disclosure in human terms of immanent and transcendent Reality, at the centre of its faith, Christianity draws stupendous conclusions about the world. There emerges, from the distinctive Christian experience, a distinctive world-conception, in which the union of Deity and humanity effected in Christ is both focus and point of radiation. The world, on this view, is created, sustained and penetrated by an eternal, spiritual, super-personal, inexhaustibly rich, self-existent, ultimate Reality, whose nature is love. That Reality, self-disclosed by his activity throughout the creative process, has concentrated his self-disclosure for men on this planet in the supreme and definitive human life of Christ; in him there is a life which is in a real and decisive sense divine as well as human. Through that life, there has been released into the world of men a new energy which is its continuation in another form, enabling men to share in the divine purpose and live eternally in the midst of time, in communion with one who rose victorious over death and now reigns at the heart of the Reality whose intimate self-expression he most significantly is found to be. Through the whole Christian complex, God "got into human life" in a degree entirely unparalleled, and for Christian faith never to be surpassed since what has once been done need not be done again.

Christianity, thus sketched, must be thought out again in the light of our modern scientific and philosophical forms. There need be no reduction nor accommodation of Christianity to fit the vagaries of science or philosophy; there must be a sympathetic understanding of these trends of thought, as St Thomas Aquinas sympathetically studied Aristotelian philosophy and presented Christianity in its terms. What we most need is a continuation of that daring venture of his—the placing of Christianity in its new context. In that context, we shall see how it fulfills the

function of interpreting human experience and giving meaning to the whole of things. The Christian data have a unique importance; they are rightly held to be normative for our understanding of man, the world, and God. It is that profound significance which we must safeguard, knowing that Christianity still offers power to live richly and fruitfully, and likewise the only ultimate explanation of our place in this mysterious world.

A THEOCENTRIC EMPHASIS FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

By CLARA O. LOVELAND, Glendale, Ohio

The renewed vitality in the field of theology today challenges the basis of our present work in religious education. It is not necessary to concern ourselves with the many disagreements between individual theologians. Rather let us concentrate on five general trends that emerge from the group as a whole: (1) the reaction against liberalism; (2) a realistic theology; (3) revived interest in revelation; (4) rethinking the social gospel; and (5) the new place of the church.¹ What significance has each of these for religious education?

I. THE REACTION AGAINST LIBERALISM

A frequent criticism of liberalism is that it has been too optimistic about human nature. Has any group been more guilty of underestimating the power of sin in life than we in religious education? With complete confidence in the infinite educability of children we have set out to bring in the millennium by the comparatively simple process of increasing our teaching skill. The young people of my experience on the whole face the ugly facts of life more frankly than those of us who are teaching them. As a result we seem to them "insincere," "hypocritical," "evasive." The "ideal conduct" taught in Sunday school seems to them "silly"; they point out that even in the church which is sponsoring their training it is not the good man, but the rich, that has the prestige. The teacher who begins with an honest appreciation of the essential truth of the dogma of original sin will do much to win the confidence of his group!

¹ See "The Younger Theologians," by Dr Samuel Cavert, *Religion in Life*, autumn, 1936.

Unless we do base our teachings on an adequate understanding of the power of sin, we fail to reach our pupils in any vital way, for we are not dealing with them as they know themselves to be. The word "sin," however, has to be given meaning in terms of their own experience. Most young people are willing to admit their failure to live up to their ideals in their actions. Often, though, they feel no tension or personal responsibility as a result, for they say that ideals that are lofty enough to strive towards are never realized. They are less conscious of the things we all do deliberately that are wrong. If we consider sin the force of egoism in each one of us, and discuss the evils to which it leads, we find that our pupils are already aware of the problem from personal experience. Indeed we may find that they are more conscious of the difficulty of making a proper adjustment to one's self than we!

Certainly one of the greatest problems for adolescents is that of establishing a balanced relation between their own egos and other selves. During this period they are seeking to become free from their childish dependence on their families and to determine independently the direction their lives shall take. Christian educators have a splendid opportunity to help in this process, if they constantly remember the two-fold aspect of the Christian teaching about the self: (1) that everyone is important as an individual, and (2) that aggressive self-assertion is sin.

It is less common now than in the past to make the mistake of forgetting that young people must establish themselves as individual personalities. If we exhort a group of high school pupils to lead lives of self-denial and sacrifice before they have secured a wholesome independence, we may complicate rather than assist in their adjustments. A child who is finding it difficult to grow up will seize upon the ideal of sacrifice as an excuse for not breaking away from the unhealthy dominance of his family. Those who are better adjusted will simply reject any way of life that fails to recognize the importance of their being conscious of themselves as individuals. Adequate self-realization is the first responsibility of moral beings.

The more common mistake today, however, is the failure to recognize the evils of an over-emphasis on self-expression. Many students now in high school are thoroughly egocentric because all their previous education has revolved around their individual interests. They have not been trained in discipline or self-control, partly for fear of inhibitions, but even more because restraint was no longer felt to be needed. The assumption has been that human beings are fundamentally good, and so can be counted on to act unselfishly in the interests of society as a whole. Young people have no such illusions. Social ideals have been presented to them but their rule of life remains an exaggerated form of rugged individualism. As they hate interference and have the supreme confidence of youth in their ability to take care of themselves, they argue that the best application of the Golden Rule is for everyone to fend for himself, neither asking nor giving help. It really seems foolish to them to go around worrying about others instead of concentrating on making all one can of one's self. Sometimes they are motivated by the desire to achieve personal recognition, but often they are frankly selfish. One minister's daughter told me that she knew from experience that it was false to teach that greater happiness resulted from unselfish than from selfish conduct. Consideration for others might be the higher ideal, but it was going after whatever one wanted with whole-hearted determination that brought the best results. She admitted that her way was often hard on her father, but added with a grin that he said he liked to be unselfish. By constantly urging our pupils to more complete self-expression, we are fostering in them an aggressive egoism that is almost certain to lead to tragedy in their own lives and in society.

Because of our optimistic conception of human nature, we have tried to control maturing children by presenting ethical codes, for it has always been recognized that adolescents are determining the standards they mean to live by. Again the idea has been that human beings will choose to be good, provided they are shown clearly what is good. The majority of young people of my experience resent the efforts of adults to state in any final

way what is good conduct. Moreover, for a young person to believe that his whole ethical problem is solved by the simple adoption of a set of rules seems to me to complicate rather than to relieve the problem of the religious educator. Those who feel that they have lived up to their code are smugly self-satisfied. I remember one pupil who in her own opinion rarely fell short of her code and was leading an exemplary life, but her only motive to goodness was the pleasure she felt in being superior to others. Surely such self-righteousness is poor preparation for life. As Christian educators must we not rigorously guard against such attitudes? In the case of those who are conscious of their failure to live up to the standards they have accepted, the result is less easy to see, yet I believe more serious. Having been raised on the idea that men are, for the most part, good, they are deeply humiliated because they know they fall so far short of their own highest standards. They have not learned that finite beings never attain to complete perfection. More tragic still, we have failed to teach them to look beyond themselves for the power to overcome their impulse to sin. We have deprived them of the reassurance contained in the doctrine of grace, that through God's grace the truly repentant experience forgiveness of their sins and the possibility of a new beginning. When we give out a code of rules as the solution of man's ethical problem, the profundity of the Christian understanding of sin has been lost.

So far our discussion has been entirely of individual sin, but one of the most important aspects of adolescent education is to bring out the fact that we all participate in the sins of society. All too often young people see social evils as something quite apart from themselves, due to the bad will of individual bad men. A vital part of our task, in connection with the problem of sin, is to prevent young people from putting the blame for the evils inherent in society off on other people, and to make them realize that each one of us is involved in the corporate sin of society in which the exploitation of the weak and the suffering of the innocent are universal. The social message of Christianity, however, will be dealt with more fully later on.

Only by relinquishing our overly optimistic conception of man and returning to the traditional conviction of the power of evil in human life can we adequately meet the needs of modern young people. We must help them to find themselves, yet to be fully conscious of egotism as the source of sin. The problem of growing up is not to gain more and more freedom in self-assertion, but rather freedom from the demands of the self through relation with a greater good. The consciousness of the inadequacy of our human resources for coping with the drive within us towards aggressive egoism is the beginning of our consciousness of the power of the grace of God in our lives. Christianity does not teach that man needs to trust to the strength of his own will in his effort to do right. Nor has it taught that any failure is final. It teaches that God's will for us, not our own, is primary, and that through His mercy and goodness we occasionally triumph over evil and transform failure into success. The problem of the adjustment of the ego ends for each one of us only as we realize the truth of Dante's words: "In His will is our peace."

II. A REALISTIC THEOLOGY

It is a tragic commentary on our times that any frank statement of the fact of the dependence of man on God is usually brushed aside as both weak and distasteful. Generally speaking there is no felt need of God. Mankind is suffering from a badly inflated ego. Advances in science and sanitation have given him a sense of self-made progress which blinds him to the more profound realities of life. Even in religious education in recent years, we have relegated God to a secondary position by putting our primary emphasis on religion as a subjective experience. We have not deliberately intended to make God seem unimportant to young people, yet that has been the result. They are determined realists, vigorously discarding all that seems to them romantic and sentimental in their effort to get down to essentials. When we place our stress on personal religious experience, they say that it is probably a mere psychological self-illusion. When we make

worship and prayer mere adjuncts to a social gospel, they maintain that they do not need such artificial stimulation to activity. They have been taught to believe that man is competent to handle any situation that he faces clearly. When we speak of God in terms of our highest values, they simply say they are not interested in the hazy overtones of life. They are seeking to come to grips with the fundamental and necessary, with objective Reality whatever it may turn out to be. The present tendency of religious education to identify itself with secular education, claiming only that religion is a "quality" or "attitude" coloring all life, has done much to discredit it in the eyes of young people, for it appears to them an added, not an essential part of existence.

Furthermore, a realistic theology requires that we include in our discussions the hard, ugly facts of life, instead of limiting ourselves to the good, the true and the beautiful. There is a great deal of truth in the accusation of young people today that religious instruction is often sentimental and unrealistic. Any real understanding of the nature of God must include an honest understanding of the extent of evil and innocent suffering in the world. No conception of God that is based only on a rosy view of life and that fails to take into serious consideration the facts of sin, suffering and death, can make any claim to validity with our realistic youth.

In their determination to find what is real young people are putting their ultimate trust not in God but in science. They do not want vague generalities but facts, and they have unlimited confidence in man's ability to know and do all that matters. As the field of science is still expanding, the more idealistic see in it great opportunities for service. They look to it for a satisfying explanation of all existence. Religion, which appears to them as a mere matter of personal prejudice, has been displaced by science which seems more objective, more fundamental and hence more ultimate.

A realistic theology includes all that science can discover and still transcends it. For example let us consider the various explanations given to children as to what makes a tree. Our

grandmothers used to say simply that trees were made by God. A friend of mine was told recently by a religious educator not to say that to her small son, as it sounded too much like magic. Instead the church school class of which the boy was a member undertook a project on tracing the growth of a tree, stage by stage. Is that a satisfactory answer to the child's question? Even though we follow every step in the process of development, from the acorn to the full-grown oak, we are still confronted by the essential mystery of the how and why of life itself. Scientists do not create; they are working with "given" material. A man's mind may penetrate more and more deeply into the secrets of the universe, yet its existence and his own existence and the fact that he has a mind to use, are all gifts from a Power much greater than he. Naturally we want to know all that science can teach us, but ought we not be more honest about what it cannot explain and cannot do? The limits of science afford the religious educator a good approach to the understanding of a cosmic conception of God as the Creator and Sustainer of all life.

Only for those who start with some cosmic idea of God has the concept of Him as Father real validity. It has been badly abused of late. The parents of today are on the whole so indulgent of their children that the word "father" tends to relax rather than heighten moral tensions. Then, too, it has been used in describing God as our co-worker, in which capacity He seems quite unnecessary to modern, self-confident youth. Above all it has become difficult to use today because it sounds sentimental. It is associated in their minds with the teaching that God is Love, —to them an empty concept. The rule of life, they say, is the survival of the fittest, and "love" is too soft to play any real part. Our gentle words are thrown aside, as modern young people continue their search for the hard facts of life. Yet we have what they are seeking. They are trying to establish some sort of personal relation with objective Reality in order to give their existence meaningfulness. When we claim that God not only is the cosmic Creator and Sustainer of all life, but also our

Father, we have done just that. We have said that objective Reality is personal and cares for each one of us, and consequently each individual life has significance.

On the whole, though, the task of religious educators is not primarily to hand down ready-made conceptions of God. Our terms at best are only symbolic; if they are no longer vital, we must find some other approach. It is hard, for example, to imagine helping young people much with their adjustments in our present industrial civilization by discoursing at length on God as the Good Shepherd, yet that has been in its time a valuable concept. Our responsibility as religious educators is rather to make young people conscious of their need of God and realistic about their dependence on Him. What tragic disillusionment lies ahead for those who are trusting only in themselves and other men! We have already touched on two ways to begin: (1) to help them realize their inadequacy to cope with the drive to egotism in each of us, and (2) to make them conscious of the limits of science and of all created beings. The fact, emphasized by the younger theologians, that in the relationship between God and man the initiative is taken by God means that we cannot hand over to our young people any real knowledge of God, no matter how much we teach about Him. But we can and must encourage in them a readiness to know Him. The traits we need to build on are naturally present in childhood. A child's sense of wonder and awe, for example, should be fostered instead of killed by constantly explaining away all that is marvelous with inadequate rationalizations. A penetrative imagination can be developed into the faculty of sensitive perception of spiritual realities, intrinsic in our experience, yet rarely superficially obvious. Even the idea of a dependence that includes individual responsibility may begin for a child in his relation to his family. Reverence, humility, love,—all these old-fashioned virtues are present to some degree in children and as religious educators we must encourage, not stifle them. It is unfortunate that the words today have such sentimental connotations for the character traits for which they

stand are in fact strong, not weak, and fundamental in our search to know all we can of God.

Besides emphasizing man's need of God, we are responsible for passing on to our pupils all the records we have of His revelation of Himself. We must teach them the significance of our forms of worship, our hymns, prayers and creeds, as they have come to us through the ages. Young people are naturally interested in comparative religions, and it is valuable to examine all man's religious insight, wherever and whenever revealed. But the richest single source of knowledge of God as He has touched the lives of men remains the Bible. There is no better basis for a young person's formulation of a religious philosophy of life than tracing the development of man's understanding of God and His will for men in the Old Testament. For the Christian, of course, God's supreme revelation of Himself is found in the person of Jesus Christ. With a realistic theology, it becomes so important for man to discover all that he can about God's will for His creation that the accumulated religious insights of the past are of the utmost significance for him, especially the records about Jesus Christ.

III. REVIVED INTEREST IN REVELATION

It is not easy for us to accept the idea of revelation. As a result of our exaggerated sense of the importance of man, we have refused to acknowledge the validity of supra-rational knowledge. What we cannot explain to the satisfaction of our little minds, we have discarded as impossible.

Are we conscious of the extent to which our rational, anti-supernatural approach to reality has affected our teaching about Jesus Christ? In the first place there is a decided tendency to omit all that savors of the miraculous. It is interesting to examine current textbooks on the life of Christ and note what a large per cent. either omit the birth and resurrection stories entirely or quote directly from the Bible without the interpretive material given in other lessons. Only miracles of healing are

referred to, as a rule, and they are explained in terms of hypnotic power. The primary emphasis is on the Jesus of history, as a teacher and as an example to be emulated. At the same time that Jesus is presented as a man among men, often His teachings are appealed to, as having special authority. My pupils have been confused by this, maintaining that they see no particular reason for following Jesus' teachings any more than any one else's. Have we any right to select from historic Christianity only one small part that happens to appeal to our present mood, to hand on to the next generation?

Surely we ought to attempt to give a more complete idea of the meaning of Jesus Christ in the world! The manhood and the Godhead of Christ are equally part of the traditional teaching of Christianity. We need to remember the Jesus of history, but we cannot discard so carelessly the supernatural from His life. At the same time we do not want to return to a fundamentalistic acceptance of the Bible, for we must recognize the validity of modern Biblical criticism. In connection with the Christmas stories, for example, as we study the differences in the Gospel records, we cannot help noting that the main point to each of the writers was that the life of Jesus was in a very special way the work of God. It is not the form of the records that matters, but the fact that Jesus was not just another man among men. In the same way, the records of the Resurrection differ so that it is impossible to know exactly what occurred. However we can start with the fact of the great change that came over the disciples because of their conviction that Jesus lived, and then study the differing attempts to put into words what actually happened. It is true throughout the Gospels that the writers stress not the miracles themselves, but the power that only Jesus had. Moreover He has remained the Living Christ through the ages in too vital a way to be ignored. Young people like to be given all the facts and allowed to evaluate for themselves. Why should we not discuss with them quite freely the different meanings that Jesus Christ has had for men, including the traditional Catholic belief, the liberal, the Unitarian and even

the Jewish? At the same time as Christian educators are we not under obligation to use all our influence to try to make real to our pupils, in a vital way, His authority? Our primary emphasis should be on Jesus Christ as God's special revelation of Himself. Only then have we the right to appeal to His life and teachings as authoritative.

There is a need in the world today for a revived appreciation of the traditional Christian doctrines of the person of Christ. Because the terminology of our dogma has become difficult for us to understand, we are inclined to regard it as meaningless. We forget that our formulated Christian doctrines grew out of men's efforts to hand on to succeeding generations the profound insights into the meaning of life and the power to live it, that had come to them through their knowledge of Jesus Christ. Our responsibility as Christian educators is to help this generation understand the essential truths our dogma seeks to convey. Though it lies beyond our ability to give pupils a vital knowledge of Christ in their lives, we must show them that through the ages men have discovered in Him the freedom to act in accordance with their ideals. The grace of God through Christ is the Christian's source of power. Another insight that comes to us through the person of Christ relates to the problem of suffering. Through the Cross, Christianity has been able to face the most tragic facts of life undismayed. In the crucifixion, the sin of the self-righteous and the extent of the suffering of the innocent are clearly revealed. The death of Christ shows us the wrongs against which we must strive, and at the same time gives us the courage for the fight, for we know that the apparent failure of the Cross was in reality spiritual victory. It is because of this revelation from God that in the midst of the injustice and confusion of the world, we can still believe in the ultimate triumph of good. How keenly young people today need both the challenge and the hope that belong to Christianity! Man's source of knowledge and power for the Christian is found in God's revelation of Himself in Jesus Christ. Belief in supernatural revelation is the basis for the authority of Christianity.

IV. RETHINKING THE "SOCIAL GOSPEL"

There is at present among the younger theologians a tendency to rethink the social gospel. They have grown more realistic about the social interpretation of Christianity; though they do not intend to separate the thought of God from the social responsibility of man, they have grown critical of some of the original assumptions of the social gospel. No longer do they count on the simple process of evolution and man's fundamental goodness to result in an ideal society. It is again being recognized that the Kingdom of God cannot be established by the power of man. The tendency to reduce the Kingdom of God to the level of human culture is being pointed out. In order to improve our social environment we must be clear as to what lies within our powers. Perhaps more than any other field religious education needs to rethink its social message!

At the present time our main emphasis is on character education and education for social change, yet what motive do we offer for either? An appeal to Jesus as the "Best Man" does not carry authority. Nor do modern young people find within themselves moral postulates, convincing them of the need of sacrificing their privileges in the interest of society as a whole. Instead they incline to a policy of each man for himself. Even the familiar appeal to reason—that we must grant to others the rights we wish for ourselves—is of no avail, for they really believe that the man with the most initiative and ability always will and should come out ahead. Poverty was no handicap to Abraham Lincoln! It takes more than an appeal to their better selves or to their reason to make modern young people social-minded.

It is not merely adequate motivation that we lack in our present attempts at social education. Whatever made us believe that we had the power to bring about an ideal age through our own efforts? By simple exhortations and elaborate pedagogical devices for the exercise of virtue under supervision, we have undertaken to deliver the world from evil and establish the Kingdom of God on earth. What an illusion of grandeur! We have

put our trust in various social and political organizations, only to be disappointed. Will we never learn that the strong exploit the weak, no matter what group grows strong? Our faith in the ability of education to control individual lives and human institutions has betrayed us into reducing our concept of the Kingdom of God to the level of human culture.

Certainly we have not been making clear to our pupils the New Testament idea of the Kingdom. As part of our subjective emphasis, we have stressed the "Kingdom within," identifying it with our own aspirations. The completed Kingdom of the future, moreover, we have presented as the final establishment of perfect justice on earth as the culmination of our education about brotherhood and international good will. We have forgotten that it is God's Kingdom, not man's. It is only through God's grace that it exists to some extent within us in the present, as the beginning here and now of some eternal worth. In these times of confusion and change, when it is evident that we may be approaching the end of civilization as we know it, our Utopian dreams of a self-made destiny for man are utterly inadequate. How much more we have to offer our young people in the traditional emphases of judgment, repentance, hope! Dynamic Christianity does not expect to build its own kingdom; instead it is intent on relating this world to the Kingdom of God.

There is one further evil in our present approach. As an escape from introversion, we offer young people social activity as an avenue of adjustment. But service of others that is undertaken for the sake of one's own satisfaction often does more harm than good. For example, the effect on privileged children of taking Christmas baskets to their less fortunate "brothers" is frequently appalling. How our egos enjoy the role of Lady Bountiful! There is no real concern about the misery and suffering of others. Interest remains focused on the self.

The solution of these evils is not to abandon the social gospel, but to work towards its ideals more realistically. We need to remember that "Love thy neighbor" is the second great commandment, not the first. Moreover, neither of the great com-

mandments carry authority except to those who accept Christ. In order to help secure social progress in this world, we must place our primary emphasis in religious education on seeking God with our whole heart and soul and mind. For any profound insight and any significant advance, we must discipline ourselves to "wait patiently for Him." To recognize honestly the limits of what we can do is not to suggest inactivity. The heightened tensions that result from a dynamic realization of God will compel us to increase and strengthen our efforts towards social betterment. Through Christ, God has revealed His will for men and has given us the opportunity to serve Him. And it is in service rendered to Him that we find freedom from ourselves. As religious educators we must teach above all the primacy of God in our lives.

V. THE NEW PLACE OF THE CHURCH

There is at present a much greater emphasis being put on the idea of the Church than has been characteristic of Protestantism in the past. Christianity is not being considered an individual possession needing no corporate expression, but rather as a life in society. Two facts, which we have been inclined to overlook, are being stressed: (1) that fellowship is central to the Christian religion, transcending national barriers and secular cultures, and (2) that the church is not merely what we make it today, but an important part of the historic movement of Christianity. It is quite possible that, in this rethinking, the Church may meet felt needs of modern young people and overcome their present objections.

Their most serious objection to the Church at present is that it does not stand for anything. We have made religion so much a matter of personal experience that they see no value in public worship. As they say, it is true that a spontaneous feeling of worship is more apt to occur when one is alone in some beautiful spot than at eleven o'clock on Sunday morning. Moreover, there seems to them more sincerity in a prayer that rises in one's heart

than in any number that are recited by some one else. As long as the Church remains merely a meeting house, they have no use for it, especially as those who collect in it on Sunday are so often interested in social contacts rather than in religion.

Another reason that the Church has no meaning for them is that there are no real requirements for membership. Instead of restricting the number that may join to those who sincerely wish to lead Christian lives, we count as most successful the church with the largest enrollment, no matter how pagan. Ministers and parents cheapen the whole idea of church by pleading with young people to join, coaxing and even bribing. Many a one of my acquaintance has entered into church membership to avoid having to go to Sunday school any more. Furthermore, those who have honestly tried to understand the responsibility they were undertaking in joining, say again and again that they cannot find out. In classes of preparation, which are made as few as possible lest they be inconvenient and an indifferent lamb escape from the fold, either they are given some meaningless dogma to learn or they are exhorted to lead a good life. All that they are urged to pledge is financial support. Young people cannot help noticing that churchgoers are not necessarily, or even usually, the finest members in the community, and they suggest from their own experience that it is probably because nothing in particular is expected of them.

If the Church does take seriously its responsibility for universal fellowship, it is probable that many young people will respond. They are looking for some movement of international and interracial good will that they can trust. But they will never trust the Church as long as its aims are identical with those of any particular political or social set-up. There must be a real fellowship, not of nation or race or class, but of all who are earnestly seeking to realize the purpose of God for the world as revealed by Jesus Christ. Loyalty will be given less to the Church as an institution than to Christianity as a movement.

It is high time for our churches to regain their perspective and to see themselves again as a part of historic Christianity.

So great has been our subjective emphasis in religious education that the majority of young people believe that if they personally reject Christianity, it will cease to be. We have given them no sense of the power and the vitality it has had, and will have, regardless of their individual approval or disapproval. Certainly we have been to blame for putting our focus on the present, with a glance towards the future, ignoring the past. The Church has failed to appreciate and keep vital its spiritual heritage.

The failure of the Church in this respect is especially obvious to the young people who have been recently connected with our church schools. The various groups with whom I have had direct contact complain that they are not being taught anything. Where vital work is going on it is a duplication of secular school work. Yet the young people themselves offer thoroughly concrete suggestions of the ways in which they would like help from the Church school. They want the traditions of the Church made intelligible and vital to them. Without help they cannot understand its terminology, nor have they background enough to get for themselves the living values of the Bible. They need assistance in learning to worship. As one child said to me, Sunday school should be to church what the children's concerts are to the regular symphony concerts; that is, they should give an intelligent basis for appreciation. But above all they look to the Church for "something to live by," for the great Christian insights that will help them live fully. Young people are consciously formulating religious and social philosophies of life, and they want from the Church schools an understanding of all the ways in which Christianity has been vital to men in the past. When the Church remembers that it is part of a great historic movement, surely it must resume the responsibility of passing on dynamically, from generation to generation, its full inheritance.

If there is a tendency in this paper to stress the needs of our young people, it is only by way of protest against those who feel that theology is irrelevant to life. The primary emphasis has been that God is not made for man, but man for God. Our needs are secondary to His will. Nor is it the purpose of this

article to plead for tradition as such. In an article on "Tradition and Orthodoxy" in the *American Review* for March, 1934, T. S. Eliot explains both the dangers and the values of tradition. He compares it to a tree, whose leaves are blown away, "when they have separately ceased to be vital. Energy may be wasted at this point in a frantic endeavor to collect the leaves as they fall and gum them on to the branches; but the sound tree will put forth new leaves, and the dry tree should be put to the axe." Many of the leaves of our Christian tradition have fallen, but the tree is still sound, as is shown by the renewed vitality of our theology. If religious education will only follow its lead, putting the primary emphasis on God, it too may be saved!

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHAADAYEV

By CLARENCE AUGUSTUS MANNING, Columbia University

During the past century there has been developed in Russia a long series of thinkers, largely laymen, who have paid a great deal of attention to the Christian interpretation of history with especial reference to the part that Russia itself was to play in it. They have sought to interpret the entire history of humanity usually from the standpoint of what we may call Orthodox sociology, although their fundamental starting point is to be found rather in their views of the Russian past than in the teachings of Orthodox theology in the narrower sense of the word.

One of the first of this group was Peter Yakovlevich Chaadayev who aroused in Russian thought far greater interest than the bulk of his works would seem to indicate, for he left behind him merely a collection of four Philosophical Letters written in French and a small number of unfinished works, letters, and fragments, which together hardly give a clear idea of the philosophy which he was trying to develop. At the same time he was a close friend of most of the outstanding Russians of the early part of the nineteenth century and his name became known not merely in Russia but also in Germany and France at an early period.

His career was unusual but not untypical of men of his own class and temperament. Chaadayev was born in Moscow in 1794. He received a good education for the times and entered the army. He served in the Semenovsky Regiment of the Guards and with this regiment entered Paris after the downfall of Napoleon. After the conclusion of peace he continued in the service until he suddenly resigned in 1821. The reasons for his sudden withdrawal are not definitely known but he seemed to undergo some form of mental or nervous crisis. He went abroad and remained in Western Europe until 1826, when he returned

to Moscow and for the next four years lived in almost complete isolation. Then in 1830 he suddenly re-entered society and attempted to publish some of the writings and ideas of his previous period.

His success in bringing out the Philosophical Letters incurred the hostility of the government of Nicholas I and led to his being considered as an insane man. He had dared to criticize some of the favorite ideas of the Tsar and as punishment he was placed under the supervision of an alienist. At the conclusion of this period in 1837, he wrote a fragment, *The Apology of a Madman*, and from then on until the end of his life in 1856, he lived quietly in Moscow, visiting friends and talking extensively, but he did not try to write anything more, or at least, if he did, nothing has been preserved.

Such a career was typical of the wasted intellects of Russian society; but nevertheless Chaadayev is worthy of some attention because of his associations with the leaders of many of the Russian intellectual movements both in the Church and also in literature, and he left some impression through his scanty writings also on men like Dostoyevsky and Vladimir Solovyev.

It must be admitted, however, that there was perhaps some ground for the attitude assumed towards him by the Imperial Government, for in the First Philosophical Letter Chaadayev expressed an attitude toward Russia which was typical of many of the would-be emigrés and devotés of Western culture at the expense of everything Russian. Besides that, before he retired from the army and during his stay in Western Europe afterwards, Chaadayev was closely associated with the mystical movement of his day, especially that portion of it which was under the influence of Jung Stilling.

The extracts from a diary which he wrote at this period show him in a state of spiritual hypochondria. He is continually trying to realize the presence of God and seems unable to concentrate even on the reading of a single book, lest at that particular moment this should not be the specific task which the Spirit would have him do. During this period of his life,

Chaadayev seems to have followed primarily Stilling and other German Protestant mystics instead of seeking for any meaning in the works of Orthodox writers. Still later he turned in thought to many of the Roman Catholic priests and laymen who played a prominent rôle in Russian society and thought, such as Bonald and de Maistre.

On the whole, however, the mind of Chaadayev was strictly logical and the appeal that was made to him by the Roman Catholic Church was largely an intellectual and logical appeal. He never became himself a member of that Church but remained loyal to Orthodoxy. Furthermore he never discussed his attitude so far as we know but he continued with a curious inconsistency for one so logical to defend the Roman Catholic system without ever caring to join it.

When we consider the general movements which were forming in the Russia of his day, we see that the two great tendencies were those of the Westerners and the Slavophiles. The former group was composed of those people who were endeavoring most thoroughly to turn themselves into Europeans. They sought to complete the reforms of Peter the Great and to wipe out from Russia everything which was not in their eyes European. As the movement developed, this group came to be rationalistic, if not atheistic, and agnostic in its religious outlook and emphasized the abolition of the Imperial Government and the replacing of it by a Western constitutional system.

On the other hand the Slavophile group magnified those points in which Russian society differed from that of Western Europe and argued that Russia had already copied too much from the West. They were in more or less degree inclined to overthrow the reforms of Peter the Great. They were vitally interested in the development of Orthodox thought and under the leadership of Khomyakov and others like him, they tended to eliminate from Russian Orthodox writings the type of Orthodox scholasticism that had been developed in Kiev in the seventeenth century to defend the Orthodox Church from the arguments of the Polish scholastic scholars of the day.

Chaadayev was one of the early Westerners. During his army service he was the friend of many of the men who were to lead the Decembrist movement in 1825, but he did not develop any of the constitutional ideas of this group. In fact his writings abound with criticism of anything that savors of democracy or an attempt to limit the power of the Tsar. At the same time he was in many ways hostile to the state of affairs in Russia. If part of the Slavophiles opposed the government because it was too Western, Chaadayev definitely withdrew from it because it was not sufficiently European. It might be unjust to argue that by European he meant the extreme European reaction; but such questions apparently did not enter the mind of Chaadayev, and we must consider him as a logical exponent of certain ideas which might or might not be founded in fact.

Thus he writes A. I. Turgenev in 1832 about Rome:

What! You live in Rome, and you do not understand it, after we talked so much about it! Remember once and for all that this is not a usual city, a heap of stones and people, but a boundless idea, a tremendous fact. You must look at it not from the Capitoline Tower, not from the Tower of St Peter's, but from the spiritual height, to which it is so easy to rise, by walking with your steps on its sacred ground. Then Rome will be transfigured before you. . . . You will understand then that Rome is the bond between the ancient and modern world, since it is absolutely necessary that there should be in the world a point where every man can turn with the aim of coming into contact concretely, physiologically, with all the memories of the human race, with something palpable, tangible, in which all the idea of the centuries is incarnate, and that this point is Rome. Then this prophetic ruin will proclaim to you all the fates of the world, and it will be for you the entire philosophy of history, the whole world-outlook, more than that—a living revelation. . . . But the pope, the pope? Is he not merely an idea, a pure abstraction? Look at that old man carried in his sedan chair under a canopy, in his triple crown, now as a thousand years ago, as if nothing in the world had changed; really, where is the man? Is he not an almighty symbol of time, not of passing time but of that which is immovable, through which everything passes, but which stands unconfused and in which and by which all things are accomplished? Tell me, do we not need that there should be on the earth some unpassing spiritual monument? De we not need some other human creation than the granite pyramids, which would be able to resist the law of death?¹

This same attitude toward Rome can be seen again in the *Fourth Philosophical Letter* when in a discussion of Gothic

¹ M. Gershenson, P. Ya. Chaadayev, p. 299.

architecture Chaadayev includes the Church of St Peter in Rome as an example of Christian architecture and notes that although it is not Gothic, still he deliberately includes it because it possesses the same qualities.²

Thus when Chaadayev seriously undertakes to prepare a philosophy of history, he abandons any attempt at the production of anything that may be called history. In fact several times he definitely expresses his disapproval of those historians who endeavor to study and recover the facts of history. The real task now is not to collect historical data—that is already secured—but to meditate on history. "Once we admit this, history naturally must enter the general system of philosophy and become a component part of it."³

Side by side with this goes a remarkable aversion to the classical authors and culture. Chaadayev can see little more in the Greek past than St Paul listed at the end of the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. He roundly condemns Socrates and Marcus Aurelius; he has a few kind words for Epicurus, practically none for Plato, fewer still for Aristotle, and he showers Homer with unblushing contempt. He applies the same judgment to all the works of Greek and Roman art and architecture. He denounces them as materialistic, as earthly, incapable of raising the thoughts to anything higher than the animal instincts of man, etc. No early Christian apologist faced with a militant paganism could resort to more violent attack. Christian Constantinople fares little better in his diatribe upon everything that disagrees with his own logic and his own reasoning.

It is curious then to turn from this attack on all the predecessors of Christianity to note the kind words that he has for Mahomet and Islam. He praises Islam for propagating monotheism and for quoting Christ so often in the Koran.

Islam represents one of the most remarkable examples of the general law; to judge of it otherwise means to deny the all-embracing influence of Christianity, from which it sprang. The most essential quality of our religion lies

² Gershenson, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

³ *Second Letter*, Gershenson, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

in the fact that it can be clothed in the most diverse forms of religious thought, and is able in case of need to be combined with error, to attain its full result. In the great process of the development of revealed religion, the teaching of Mahomet must be considered one of its branches. . . . And not to see the working of Christianity wherever even the name of the Savior is mentioned, not to notice that He exerts an influence on all minds, in whatever way they come into contact with his teachings—means not to have a clear perception of the great work of redemption, and to understand nothing of the great mystery of Christ; otherwise we would have to exclude from the number of people who enjoy the mercy of redemption, the majority of people who carry the name of Christians—and would it not mean this, to reduce the kingdom of Christ to trifles, and universal Christianity to an insignificant handful of people?⁴

It is curious that Chaadayev several times in the letters alludes to others that are lost but we have reason to believe that two of the lost letters dealt with the freedom of the church and with the *filioque*. It seems that he must have written about the fundamental religious teachings of Christianity, but we have no definite traces of his ideas on these subjects, except in so far as we can judge them from small hints and allusions in the *Philosophical Letters*. On the other hand it may be very likely that the actual thinking of Chaadayev in these fields was of relatively small extent. In 1846 he wrote to Sirkura the following: "Christian dogma as the fruit of the Great Reason is not subject to development nor perfecting, but it admits countless changes depending upon the conditions of national life."⁵ With such a theory, Chaadayev might have felt himself free to continue his meditations as to the application of Christian thought in the world without trying to analyze in any degree what might be called Christian thought.

At the same time he shared fully in the current nineteenth century neglect of Constantinople and Byzantine history. In the same letter, he speaks of the conversion of Constantine the Great to Christianity.

Every one knows that the acceptance of Christianity by that monarch as the official religion, was a colossal political fact, but, as it seems to me, they still do not sufficiently clearly consider the influence which it exerted on religion

⁴ *Third Letter*, Gershenson, *op. cit.*, p. 267 f.

⁵ Gershenson, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

itself. There is no doubt that the stamp placed on the church by this revolution would have been rather destructive than helpful, if fortunately Constantine had not conceived the idea of transferring the seat of government to New Rome, an act which freed old Rome from the evil presence of the emperor.

He then goes on and contrasts the attitude of St Ambrose to the Emperor Theodosius with the subservience of the Eastern hierarchy.⁶

Chaadayev does admit that Byzantium maintained the original form of Christianity and its ascetic tendencies and temperament but he contrasts this with the active social development that took place in the West and does not see in this any excessive promise for the East. It is to be noticed that like the extreme Russian nationalists whom he opposes, Chaadayev naively assumes that Orthodoxy of his day and Russian Orthodoxy are synonymous. He expresses nowhere any interest in the survival and revival of the Greeks and the other Slavs. He has little or nothing to say of the long opposition of the Byzantine Empire to the Mohammedan invasions of Europe, although he may give some slight recognition to the part that Russia played in the defence of Europe against the Tatars.

We can now see the material available for Chaadayev in the formulation of his theories. He uses conventionally Biblical history up to the time when the Jews became Hellenized and perhaps this was for him the greatest Jewish mistake. Then he accepts the history of Western Christianity and is interested in Russia and its reactions only after the time of Peter the Great.

The dialectic in this can be well seen when he speaks of the fact that the invasions of the Arabs, Tatars, and Turks merely strengthened Christianity⁷ and contrasts this with the fall of the ancient civilization.

Thus in a short period of time how many countries vanished in the ancient world, while in the history of the new nations you see merely all possible changes of geographical boundaries, while society and the separate nations *remain untouched!* I do not need to tell you that such facts as the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, the annihilation of the American tribes, and the

⁶ Gershenson, *op. cit.*, p. 312f.

⁷ *Op cit.*, p. 240.

destruction of the rule of the Tatars in Russia only confirm our decision. So also the fall of the Ottoman Empire, for example, the echoes of which are already coming to our ears, again presents the sight of one of the great catastrophes, which Christian nations are never condemned to undergo; then will come the turn of the other non-Christian nations, which live in the most remote areas of our system. Such is the circle of the all-powerful action of truth; rejecting some nationalities, taking others into its circle, it constantly grows wider, bringing us nearer to the heralded times.⁸

It is hard to see how this can be reconciled with his high praise of Islam!

If we then realize fully that the history which is to receive the benefit of the meditations of Chaadayev is not the history of the world as scholars can reconstruct it, we can pass to a consideration of the basis of his philosophy. This is the constant presence of God and the Spirit in human history, especially Christian history. He sums up this philosophy in the beginning of the *Second Philosophical Letter*.

In my foregoing letters you have seen how important it is to understand the role of thought on the expanse of the centuries; but you must find in them another thought; once having a firm hold on the fundamental idea, that in the human spirit there is no other truth except that which God with His own hand placed in it, when he brought it out of non-existence, it is impossible to consider the movement of the centuries as ordinary history does. Then it will become clear that not only does a providence or some perfectly wise reason guide the course of events, but that it exercises a direct and uninterrupted influence upon the soul of man. In fact, if you only admit that the reason of a creature, in order to come into activity, must receive originally an impulse which arises not out of its own nature, that its first ideas and first knowledge cannot be anything else than marvellous inspirations of a higher reason, does it not follow from this that the power which formed it must during the whole course of its existence exert on it the same influence which it exerted at that moment, when it gave it its first motion?⁹

Along with this Chaadayev assumes a freedom of will whereby man and nations can agree or disagree with the will of God in finding the path on which He would have them go. He therefore comes logically to his disregard for Hellenic civilization and his high regard for the heroes of the Old Testament, like Moses and David. He also can justify the idea of a favorite people of God

⁸ Gershenson, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

⁹ Gershenson, *op. cit.*, p. 225 f.

on the basis of their obedience to His commands. He frankly idealizes Moses and attacks all those critics who argue for the belief of Moses in henotheism or who doubt that the conception of Jehovah in the mind of Moses was as the One Supreme God of the entire world.

Chaadayev passes from this period to the period of Western domination by the Pope and it is here in the development of the Middle Ages that he sees the ideal development of Christian civilization. It is the conception of the unity that appeals to him and in that unity he sees the definite fulfillment of the social meaning of Christianity. He declaims against the idea of a number of nations.

We are too long accustomed to see in the world only separate countries; that is why the great superiority of modern society over the ancient is still not valued sufficiently. There has been left out of sight the fact that during a whole series of centuries this society formed a real federal system, which was destroyed only by the Reformation; that until this sad event the nations of Europe considered themselves not otherwise than as parts of one social body, divided in geographical relations into several countries, but in a spiritual sense forming one whole; that for a long time they had no other public law than the prescriptions of the church; that wars at that time were considered civil wars; that finally the whole world was inspired by one exclusive interest, moved by one aspiration. The history of the Middle Ages—in the literal sense of the word—is the history of one nation—the Christian nation. Its chief content is the development of the moral idea; purely political events occupy in it only a secondary place; and this is especially clearly shown by the wars of ideas, for which the philosophy of the past century nourished such an aversion.¹⁰

It is this spectacle that furnishes Chaadayev with the basis for his philosophy and all his discussions on morals, social problems, progress, and life. In all this he speaks with the attitude of the Europeanized class of Russian noblemen, who counted the reforms of Peter the Great as the real beginning of Russian history. It is from this point of view that he condemns the Reformation, the work of Calvin and Zwingli, of Luther, of "the tyrant Henry VIII and his hypocritical Cranmer."¹¹ He notes the tendency of Protestantism to divide itself further and further and predicts that it is destined for self-destruction through its

¹⁰ Gershenson, *op. cit.*, p. 238 f.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 250.

multiplication of sects, and he says of the invisible church of the Protestants that it is "actually invisible, as everything that does not exist."¹²

It is strange that with all his attachment to the Western system, Chaadayev does not seem to have thought seriously of joining it. The height of his infatuation with the West seems to have passed with the publication of the *Four Philosophical Letters*. At any rate, writing in 1837 to A. I. Turgenev, he has this to say on the modern world:

Political Christianity has outlived its period; in our time it has no sense; it was then necessary, when modern society was being established, when the new law of social life was being worked out. And that is why western Christianity, it seems to me, has completely fulfilled the goal destined for Christianity in general and especially in the West, where were found all the principles necessary for the creation of the new civil world. But now the situation is entirely different. The great task has been achieved; society is equipped; it has received its charter; the weapons for infinite perfection have been given to humanity; man has entered his maturity. Neither episodes of lack of principle nor episodes of oppression are able any longer to stop the human race on its course. In such wise, the reins of world rule naturally had to fall from the hands of the Roman pontiff; political Christianity had to give way to purely spiritual Christianity, and there where so long had reigned all earthly powers in all possible forms, there was left merely a symbol of unity of thought, a great lesson and a monument of the past. In a word, Christianity now has to be only the highest idea of the time, which includes within itself the ideas of all past and future times, and consequently must act upon citizenship only indirectly, by the power of thought, and not of essence. More than ever it must live in the field of the *spirit* and find for itself a definite expression.¹³

It was in all probability this distinction between the symbolic Rome and the historical Rome that lay dormant in the mind of Chaadayev and influenced him against casting in his lot with Western Christianity.

The position of Russia itself was another factor in the same development. Chaadayev like many of his class had no understanding of or sympathy for the pre-Petrine Russia. In the *First Philosophical Letter* he condemned his country's past most severely, because it had no part in the splendid Middle Ages. It had lived exclusively on the narrow ascetic ideal of Byzantium

¹² *Op cit.*, p. 251.

¹³ Gershenson, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

and it had contributed nothing to the wider world outside. It was the sweeping character of this criticism that brought so much condemnation upon Chaadayev, for most of the critics read his condemnation in the absolute and did not note that the author was thinking in terms of civilization and not abstract worth.¹⁴

Later on in the *Apology of a Madman*, he sets forth his beliefs as to the future of Russia. He judges its past somewhat more charitably, although he never came to admire the period before Peter the Great, but he predicts a real future for the country because the Russian mind and character are still largely a tabula rasa without the burden of the prejudices and traditions of Europe. He now expressed his view that Russia was still a young country and could avoid most of the mistakes of Europe, the more so as the production of such men as Peter the Great and Pushkin showed the enormous natural resources of the human material of the country. He never fully worked out this more positive side of his teaching, for during the last twenty years of his life he wrote very little and that chiefly in personal letters.

The effect that Chaadayev left on Russian thought was largely indirect. In one sense he maintained the dignity of religion per se as against the Slavophiles who were tempted to place Russia and Orthodoxy first and justify the second on the ground that it was the religion of the nation. He was here able to moderate many of their views and to furnish to them an example of a thinking religious Westerner. Yet he attained his views on Russia's future largely in a reverse order from them, and he glorified Russia largely because of her previous defects.

Without entering into discussions as to a final government of the world, he came to believe that there would be again a united Christian state, and that Russia in the future would offer this many contributions and perhaps be its centre; but he was never definite. He did not discuss the ultimate relationship of the secular and religious powers; but the ideas of Vladimir Solovyev as to the union of religious government under the Papacy and secular government under the Tsar were largely based on the

¹⁴ Cf. Gershenson, *op. cit.*, p. 140 ff.

teachings of Chaadayev. Dostoyevsky again and again alludes to the same problem and there can be little doubt that he too was influenced on many points by this same thinker.

Although he had a strictly logical mind, Chaadayev did not leave behind him a definite, thought-out philosophy. Had he done so, he would have been spared many of the criticisms that were showered upon him, as fragments of his ideas were brought before the Russian public. For this reason he cannot take the objective place in thought to which he would seem to be entitled. He was rather the first of a long series of religio-political thinkers who touched part of the problems which confronted a nation which was just entering the European system and who aimed to throw light upon its problems. Instead of a literary monument, he left behind him a disputed name and a ferment which worked vigorously in the minds of Russian philosophers for nearly a century. And he is one of those men who are largely responsible for the modern development of Russian thought and its ability to guide itself amid a changing world.

THE MORPHOLOGY OF A PROVERB

By PAUL S. MINEAR, Garrett Biblical Institute

It is not surprising that the impact of Form Criticism upon contemporary views of gospel structure should arouse conflict in many quarters. Nor is it surprising that, while some of the ensuing controversy contributes to further advance, much of it is quite devoid of positive value. Too frequently conflict centers not upon the concrete evidence upon which the new approach is based but upon the generalized conclusions of selected proponents. Debate which is concerned only with resultant theories as to the ultimate authenticity of the gospel record misconstrues the nature of the tradition and hides the real problems in a fog of ambiguities. Such debate often resembles arguments over the superiority of California weather or the Americanism of the New Deal, arguments which Stuart Chase might well have used as illustrations of "the tyranny of words." To avoid such fruitless if not heatless debate, one must repeatedly turn from attempts at generalized conclusions to the analytical study of particular units of gospel tradition without fear of ultimate results.

One gospel pericope is especially worthy of study as revealing the intricate interrelationship of forms, strata, motives and life-situations which characterizes the growing tradition.

"If any man would be first, he shall be last of all and servant of all."

—Mark 9:35.

This pericope is found in a cycle of materials offering peculiar advantages to the literary archaeologist. For not only are the individual units easily isolated, but also several strata of tradition are exposed to view, and others can be recovered with but little excavation. This catena of sayings is obviously pre-Markan in origin and is found in a state relatively untouched by literary alterations. It is inconceivable that these heterogeneous ma-

terials (Mk. 9:33-50) represent the direct testimony of an auditor or a new creation of the writer's imagination. We can be confident that the cycle preserves in large part both the pre-Markan form and the pre-Markan content. Although each of the units in this cycle permits the application of form history, space forbids the treatment of more than one, the pregnant proverb already cited. A significant number of stages in its history can be distinguished, some preceding the form in which it appears here, some succeeding it. So let us label the stage of the unit as it appears in Mark 9:33-35 as *Stage M*, and then work backward into the earlier strata and forward into the later.

In *Stage M*, the unit is a paradigm which accents the pronouncement of Jesus and interprets this pronouncement by particularizing its meaning by reference to a concrete situation. This situation, the dispute of the disciples over places of honor, is supposed to have arisen during the ministry of Jesus, but its relevance to early Christians lies in its similarity to problems which they faced. There is ample evidence of friction among the leaders of the early church, caused in part by ambitions for prominence; directed at this problem, the proverb becomes a warning to those leaders who proudly claimed the right of being served by more humble Christians. The more inclusive saying "If *any* man . . ." is applied to the small band of leaders rather than to all Christians or to all men. In its use as a paradigm, non-eschatological and ecclesiastical motifs predominate.

The editorial purpose of Mark may have differed from the motives of those who used the unit orally. (1) He may have adopted it simply as one element in the received tradition without conscious application to his own special purposes. (2) As the immediately preceding passages suggest, Mark may have wished to underscore the blindness of the original disciples who had failed to grasp the true meaning of Jesus (Lightfoot). (3) Faced with the need for strengthening weak-hearted Roman comrades in the hour of persecution, he may have wished to stress the great reward promised for acceptance of suffering. (4) He may have desired to defend the authority of Paul against the

exclusive claims of the twelve (Bacon, Loisy). Though Mark may have used the paradigm to apply to one of these specific issues, its circulation in oral tradition presupposed the more general situation of friction among Christian leaders over positions of prominence. It is as unlikely that the final editor created this form as that he created the form of each of the paradigms in the second and third chapters of his gospel.

Is there evidence of earlier strata that enables us to dig beneath this simple paradigmatic stage? A paradigm may originate in various ways: as an authentic reminiscence of a scene in the life of Jesus; as the transformation of a parable or miracle; as the crystallization of church controversies; as the addition of a narrative setting to a floating proverb. To choose the more probable alternative the following questions are relevant: Is the narrative necessary if the saying is to be intelligible? Are setting and saying independent or interdependent? Is there evidence of an earlier separation of the two? Does the same saying appear in other contexts and forms? If so, which form best explains the origin of the others?

Applying these tests with caution, we find considerable evidence of an earlier form. A glance at the cross-references indicates that the same teaching appears in a variety of forms: paraenesis, legend, symbolical narrative, and isolated proverb. Obviously, not all these forms can be primary. A priori, when a saying appears both as a proverb and as the climax of a paradigm, two possibilities are open: the narrative setting has been supplied to furnish specific meaning to the proverb, or an earlier narrative setting has been separated from the proverb. Here the former alternative must be adopted, as the evidence suggests the secondary character of the setting. There is no necessary connection between the proverb and its setting; the context adds nothing that could not be inferred from the content of the proverb itself. The saying has rich meaning apart from the context; in fact, the setting limits its meaning. Moreover, embedded in the Marcan paradigm is literary evidence of an original independence. Note the italicized words:

And they come to Capernaum: and when he was in the house he asked them, What were ye reasoning on the way? But they held their peace: for they had disputed one with another on the way who was to be greatest. *And he sat down and called the twelve* and he said unto them, If any man would be first, he shall be last of all and servant of all. (Mark 9:33-35.)

These words break the logical relationship between the preceding situation and the succeeding saying. Why should Jesus call his disciples together when they are already in the house? Why mention the twelve again when the context makes it clear that only the twelve are with him? Why mention Jesus as sitting down in order to teach a single proverb? The words in italics constitute a formula almost invariably used to introduce a series of consecutive teachings (cf. Mk. 4:1; 13:3; 12:41; Mt. 5:1; Lk. 4:20; 5:3; Jn. 6:3). In Wellhausen's phrase, they mark a new beginning. It is much easier to explain the addition of the preceding narrative than to explain the insertion of such a formula in the middle of a previous paradigm. It is also easier to explain the addition of this setting as a logical inference from the proverb than to explain why, had the setting been primitive, it should have been omitted from other records of the same proverb.

We conclude, then, that the earlier stage was one in which the proverb was included in a cycle of sayings and that the words italicized formed the introduction to the whole cycle. Other units were preserved in the same cycle without biographical context and were linked together by common words or phrases (e.g. 'in my name,' 'offend,' 'fire,' 'salt'). These mnemonic aids scattered through the cycle as links to the chain of proverbs indicate the pre-Markan existence of a "community catechism" (Bultmann). Thus, in *Stage L* of its history, our unit is proverbial in form, deposited in a series of pithy axioms which have been arranged for catechetical purposes of the Christian community. The motive seems to have been that of encouraging hospitality and fellowship among the Christians and willingness to sacrifice for the common cause. The greatest common denominator of the cycle as a whole is the eschatological demand upon the believers.

Can we penetrate to an earlier stage? Surely this catena of axioms in Mark 9:35-50 can hardly be defended as preserving the original order and content. It is difficult to imagine Jesus giving instruction in this manner. The order and arrangement are artificial, being dependent upon catchwords which aid the memory but do not contribute to smooth-flowing intelligent discourse. The sequence is neither chronological nor logical, but catechetical. We must conjecture a period in which these proverbs circulated separately in oral tradition without biographical setting or pedagogical arrangements. This conclusion is supported by the existence of the same proverb both in other cycles of axioms and in isolated form; it becomes almost certain when we notice that cognate forms of the same proverb also circulated separately, only gradually attracting specific settings. The form of the unit in *Stage K*, then, is that of a single proverb of Jesus circulating separately. Can we recover its use and interpretation during this earliest period?

To answer this question we must use data beyond the proverb itself: we must study cognate forms to see if there is a common denominator of meaning, and relate that meaning to what we know of the basic message of Jesus and the earliest church.

"The last shall be first, and the first last." This paradox appears in three different contexts: as an interpretation of the parable of the laborers (Mt. 20:16); as a conclusion to the promise of rewards to Jesus' disciples (Mk. 10:31); and as strengthening the threat of exclusion from the kingdom (Lk. 13:30). In these passages the interpretation of the same axiom varies according to motive and situation, showing a fluidity of use without fundamental change in the formula itself.

Whosoever shall exalt himself shall be humbled,
And whosoever shall humble himself shall be exalted.

This saying also appears in three connections: it is conflated with the proverb of Mk. 9:35b in the extended paraenetic discourse of Mt. 23:5f.; and it is used to clinch the meaning of two Lucan parables: the choosing of seats (14:11) and the Pharisee and the Publican (18:14). Instructive parallels may also be found

in the calls to repentance and the demands for childlike humility as prerequisite to kingdom-entrance (Mk. 10: 15; Mt. 18: 3; Jn. 3: 3-5). In inner meaning, the proverbs are akin to the Lucan beatitudes and woes, which treat separately the destinies of the "last" and the "first."

These parallels clarify the probable meaning of the proverb in *Stage K*, revealing the pronounced eschatological orientation. Here we have to do neither with contests for positions of leadership nor the instruction of converts but with the prophetic announcement of the kingdom, with its dual appeal of promise to the lowly meek and warning to the mighty wicked, addressed to the Jewish community without respect to membership in the church. The proverb in this earliest stage is an axiomatic condensation of Jesus' preaching of the kingdom, an "authentic echo" of his denunciation of the pride of those who are first and his consolation to those who are last, his demand for repentance, service, and the acceptance of injustice. *Stages K, L* and *M* are thus distinguishable at three points: form, motive, interpretation.

But while the paradigm of Mark 9: 33-35 represents at least the third stratum in the history of the proverb, it is far from the last. Both oral and written uses produced further modifications. In *Stage N*, as represented by Matthew 18: 1-5, the changes are directly due to editorial policies. The writer of Matthew is aware of the verbal and logical awkwardness of the Marcan passage, with its three fragmentary and unrelated paradigms followed by a chain of disparate axioms. Consequently he omits the last three axioms and one of the paradigms. He destroys the paradigmatic form of the first two anecdotes by conflating the settings and arranging the teachings in more intelligible order. The child is now introduced as part of Jesus' answer to the problem of ambition, illustrating two originally separate teachings. The paradigm is thus transformed into a literary paraenesis with topical arrangement of the teachings on humility. In this change, well-known Matthean tendencies are reflected. The situation is not so much the blameworthy ambition of the

original disciples as the need for a code of progress for all Christians irrespective of official status. The kingdom is practically identified with the church, and the proverb becomes part of a series of non-eschatological literary exhortations appealing to all Christians to accept Christ's code as determining their fraternal relationships.

Luke's use of the Marcan account may be labelled *Stage O* (Lk. 9:46-48). Like Matthew he has destroyed the simple paradigms of the earlier account by conflating settings and teachings. Apart from this there is little change in form; but there is marked change in motive and interpretation. Judging by the materials he omits and by the context in which he places the sayings, he wished to stress the contrast between the blindness of the disciples and the receptivity of the Samaritans. The reference to the children becomes the major context instead of the disciples' controversy. Humility is conceived as receptivity to Jesus' message and person, and as ability to recognize the necessity of his death. In fact, Jesus himself is recognized as the least among them, who shall be greatest. The proverb is utilized as part of the dramatic record of the rejection and the reception of him who is truly first of all.

Stage P, the use of the proverb in Mark 10:35-45, reflects even greater changes. The evidence justifies the hypothesis that this longer pericope is a later elaboration of the earlier form as found in Mark 9:33-35. Many scholars have suggested that the parallels between Mark 9:33-50 and Mark 10:13-45 justify the claim that they are doublets. In the same order are found sayings on the reception of children, demands for complete renunciation, predictions of suffering, and the conflict among the disciples for prestige, climaxed by the use of the identical proverb.

Confining our attention to this last passage, Mark 10:35-45, we find two elements of novelty which have been widely recognized as secondary additions (Dibelius and Wellhausen among others). The reference to the cup which James and John are to share with Jesus is extraneous and late, as is also the appeal to the death of Jesus in verse 45. If these two elements, recog-

nized on other grounds as intrusions, be removed, we have a consistent and unified narrative at every point related to the earlier form of the paradigm in Mark 9. The essentials remain the same: the desire of certain disciples to be first, the resulting dispute, the calling of the twelve to Jesus, the climaxing conclusion as to the true road to greatness.

Each case of sharpened detail in the later account is intelligible as a natural expansion of the earlier anecdote. The setting becomes more circumstantial and personal with the naming of the formerly anonymous disciples. Their petition is made more explicit and concrete, and because there are two questioners two positions of prestige are described. The question implies the expectation on the part of his disciples both of his humiliation and of his *second* coming as Messiah, a clear impress of the early church perspective. The teaching is heightened by the use of Gentile rulers as the antithesis to Christian standards, and, as both the first and the greatest are mentioned in the teaching, a correspondingly double description of pagan leaders has developed. And finally, the best example of Jesus' teaching is seen to be the death of Jesus himself. To sum up the developments in *Stage P*, we find a simple unadorned paradigm elaborated in many directions. The setting grows in length and importance until the story of James and John competes for interest with the saying of Jesus; the two chief characters are depicted in response to rising legendary interest in the apostolic martyrs; the nuclear saying is implemented by a new illustration of the vice deplored and the supreme exemplification of the virtue extolled. We can observe here the process of a paradigm being transformed into a complex legend in which many motives are operative: hagiographical, martyrological, apologetic, ecclesiastical, sacramental and Christological. These motives in turn are the expression of a vast range of needs that have emerged from an even broader range of situations in the life of the church. The pericope still preserves the pointed pronouncement of Jesus, but it has also become a colorful cross-section of Christian faith and practice.

Stage Q is to be found in Matthew's recension of this developing legend, 20:20-28. Here there are few and minor changes. The reputation of the revered apostles is shielded by attributing their question to their mother. The prediction of their baptism through death as martyrs is omitted, possibly because the identification of Christian baptism with death was either unintelligible or obnoxious to the editor. The form and content of the pericope, however, remain the same.

But a different story is told by the Lucan variant, Luke 22:24-27. This rendition, which we may label *Stage R*, marks a distinctive application of the anecdote to serve new purposes. The incident is made a part of the Passover meal. In form, the proverb becomes part of the "table-talk" of which Luke is fond. In immediate application, the teaching of humility is defined as table-service, an early Christian virtue in which Luke delighted. In its deeper meaning, however, it becomes permeated with the soteriological significance of the Passover and the Passion. "I am in the midst of you as he that serveth." The service of Jesus includes both his waiting on them and his atoning death. In fulfilling this function Jesus dramatizes the contrast between his road to greatness and that of the Gentile "benefactors." The guilt of ambition is no longer imputed to James and John, but instead they are assured of salvation and thrones in the kingdom. In this stage, then, the hagiographical and pedagogical motifs of the Marcan pericope recede and new emphasis is given to the sacramental, soteriological and Christological motifs. The atoning death of Jesus has now become the primary context of the proverb. Absent from the early stages in the proverb's history, it is adumbrated in *Stage O* (Lk. 9:48), becomes explicit in the teachings of Jesus in *Stage P* (Mk. 10:45), receives symbolic representation in *Stage R* (Lk. 22:27), and is completely embodied in mythological discourse in *Stage S*, John 13:4-17.

Turning to this final New Testament step in the proverb's history, we notice profound modifications. In the Lucan pericope the proverb itself is preserved though attention is focussed

rather upon the sacramental act of Jesus than upon his teaching. In John the mystical and mythological interpretation of the act of Jesus makes verbal repetition of the axiom unnecessary, and it disappears. The Lucan symbol provides the transition from the Marcan legend to the Johannine myth. In John the primary value does not reside in the teaching of Jesus concerning the reception of the last into the kingdom nor in his explanation of the road to greatness within the church, as he himself is incontestibly the greatest among them, being their Lord (vs. 16); rather it lies in the abiding service which Jesus continues to render his followers in cleansing them of sin. "If I wash thee not, thou hast no part with me . . ." (vs. 8). The pericope becomes a profound drama of the timeless operation of divine grace through the presence of the Incarnate Lord.

The morphology of the proverb can thus be traced from a very early period in the rise of the Christian community to a very late period, when the proverb itself is submerged and its meaning absorbed within the ecclesiastical, sacramental and mystical experience of that community. Beginning as a pungent prophetic threat-promise of an apocalypticist, remembered and repeated by his apostles as an axiomatic condensation of his message, incorporated with similar axioms into the catechetical materials of the emerging churches, attracting to itself a narrative context that provided specific reference to the problems of discipleship and leadership in those churches, adapted to the varied immediate purposes of Christian editors, expanding first into a personal legend and then into a sacramental symbol, it finally becomes embodied in an extensive myth of divine grace. In its life-history both the conserving and creating tendencies in gospel tradition are illustrated; the character of the primitive nucleus is recovered and the character of later elaborations illuminated. The oral and literary forms can be distinguished without being made into arbitrary and rigid patterns into which the living tradition must be forced. Rather, the forms are seen as fluid categories responding sensitively to the needs and changing situations of Christian men and women. Each successive stratum

of development is a dramatic picture of the way in which the message of the earliest gospel was creatively preserved and colorfully refracted through the prisms of Christian experience. Although the nuclear saying can be defended as far antedating both Mark and Q, that is not the most important point. For the primitiveness of the gospel tradition is not to be defined simply in terms of its existence in final form at any one moment of time. The units of the tradition do not have existence; they have history. In fact they *are* their history. And their validity must be defined in terms of the degree to which the history of each unit enshrines the authentic genius of the Christian faith. The history of the tradition interpenetrates the history of the church and its validity rests upon the continuing validity of the Christian faith and life.

Church Congress Syllabus No. 4

THE NATURE OF THE CHURCH

PART II. THE CHURCH AS A WORSHIPPING SOCIETY

By BAYARD HALE JONES

The School of Theology, University of the South

I. THE VITAL, NEGLECTED FACTOR

In the present age, the reaction of the average man to the subject of this discussion would be to agree that the Church is a society, *one of whose functions* is the worship of God. He might admit, in theory and as a matter of duty, that this is the Church's highest function. He would have to admit that as far as he and his kind are concerned, it is a largely neglected function. In a general way, he considers that it is the office of the Church to teach the young; to "convert" adults to an intellectual or emotional adjustment which effectuates a permanent state of "salvation"; to act locally as one of many welfare agencies; and as a totality to lead mankind toward higher ideals of social ethics. But it is his personal opinion that Sunday-School has taught him all the religious knowledge he needs in order to get through this life, and that his professed creed or his experienced "conversion" has assured him the life to come; habitual church attendance is for those who have a rather incomprehensible taste for that sort of thing; and it takes an economic disaster or a moral crisis to bring him to his knees before his God.

And this is the crux of our problem. The world, together with more than half the members of the Church, regards the practice of worship as an optional activity. The Church itself has always maintained that worship is its own essential function; that it is not only that the Church makes worship, but that it is

worship which makes the Church. If therefore after nearly two thousand years of the working of the Christian leaven, there is such an arresting discrepancy between this fundamental ideal and its realization, it may be of service to open up consideration of this subject by examining the records of the past, in the hope that history may intimate some principles which may receive practical expansion in the Church Congress discussions.

2. SOME COMPARISONS

It is true that the modern situation is nothing new. In its essentials it is as old as human history. It is a myth that there was ever a Golden Age—whether in “Catholic countries,” among the Chosen People, or in the unspoiled infancy of the race—when all the people of a nation unanimously and continually gave themselves to the worship of God.

In Pleistocene times, primitive man displayed the same traits men do today. The great climaxes of the Solar Year—the Rebirth of the Sun at the winter solstice, the Resurrection of nature at the spring equinox—brought all the tribe together for just such great corporate functions as we still perform at Christmas and Easter. The rest of the year, primitive religion was just what religion is now for the generality of mankind, an affair for women and children; the chief duties of the “clergy” were ministrations to personal needs and emergencies.

In the history of Israel, the prophets were constantly proclaiming emphatic warnings against the religious lapses of the nation, and lamenting that the faithful were only a “remnant” of the people. Conditions in the time of the New Testament are sufficiently indicated by the fulminations of St John Baptist, and by our Lord’s unsparing denunciations of both parties who claimed the religious leadership of the nation. In detail, the Pharisee in the parable certainly regarded himself as exceptional in his strict habitual practice of the rites and requirements of religion.

Mediæval times saw whole populations nominally Christian. Yet all contemporary literature shows that they were christened,

but not Christianized. And in a country steadfastly Catholic since the Reformation, the laymen's census of the region of Lille in the nineteenth century found that only 10 per cent. of the population so much as made their Easter duties.

These comparisons, however, bring us no exculpation. The prophet was not excusing but accusing himself of the failure of his ministry when he exclaimed, "I am not better than my fathers." Mankind ought to have improved since the Pleistocene; Christian liberty should show a higher loyalty than the fetters of the Jewish Law; modern enlightenment ought to have registered an advance upon the practice of the Dark Ages.

3. CHRISTIAN ORIGINS

Yet was there not a Golden Age in the Primitive Church? Did not that earliest, purest age display an ideal condition alike of faith and worship? Perhaps; but in a most limited sphere, and under circumstances altogether exceptional. The Church of the first three centuries was a plant of unique growth. It sprang from a most fertile soil; and a hostile environment kept it remorselessly pruned back from all random and untimely development, so that it was compelled to strike deep roots, and to store up great vitality in its central stock, before a more clement climate allowed it to expand its branches to cover the field.

Christianity was not an invention or an improvisation. The nature of its faith and worship cannot be understood save in the light of the religion of Israel from which it sprang. That religion was the purest, highest, simplest, most vital, of all ancient faiths; a sublime Monotheism made perfect by the things it had suffered. Whatever deductions we have made above from the estimated effectiveness of that religion, in the vicissitudes of its rise in the times of the Prophets, or its senescent decline in the days of the Scribes, nevertheless the Jewish people stood alone as a nation whose great preoccupation was religion. Religion was the chief concern of their daily life, the prime motive of all their politics, almost the sole content of their recorded literature. In particular, their worship was highly elaborated, and fixed in

definite liturgical forms, known to us with approximate accuracy in the great collections of the second and third centuries, and surviving without any fundamental changes in modern use.

Jewish worship was originally, like all primitive faiths, a religion of Sacrifice. Now the *rationale* of sacrifice is by no means what mediæval times misinterpreted it to be, "the suffering of a victim or the destruction of an offering." It was not of the essence of sacrifice that any living thing should suffer or die. It was of its essence that it should consist of something *edible*. It was an oblation of fruits from the earth, animate or inanimate indifferently. The death of the animal was only incidentally necessary before its flesh could be offered. But the slaughter of the animal was not a sacrificial act; it was carried out by the offerer himself—not the priest. Primarily, sacrifice was an offering to God of what any primitive people, always on the subsistence-margin of famine, considered their most valuable possession—food, God's bounty whereby man's life was sustained.

So all food was regarded as potentially sacred. It was dedicated in three types of sacrifice: it was wholly given to God in burnt-offering or libation; it was shared with God; or it was wholly eaten by the worshippers. Thus any destruction of an offering was entirely symbolic; but any partaking of food under any circumstances whatever was inherently a religious act: all food must be offered to God and consecrated by his acceptance; so that any Hebrew meal was indis severably Sacrifice and Communion. The first two types of sacrifice were the prerogatives of the local temples; the third of the daily life of the family.

The formal development of the public sacrifices was interrupted by the Captivity, when the Hebrews felt themselves inhibited from offering sacrifice upon unhallowed foreign soil, and were constrained to develop an entirely different sort of cultus in the form of the supplemental and substitute worship of the Synagogue. This was essentially an informal, unceremonial, and largely intellectual "ministry of the word." In form, and to some extent in intention, it was an actual "Protestantizing" of Judaism: a setting up of the Prophet against the Priest; an em-

phasis on ethics rather than worship; a supplanting of a "godly order of Morning Prayer" of the Synagogue for the "Sacrifice of the Mass" of the Temple. And the rites of propitiatory sacrifice were yet further restricted by the prophetic reform which monopolized this kind of cultus to the One Sanctuary in Jerusalem.

Yet the ancient principles of the third sort of Communion-Sacrifice survived in all their fulness in the realm of the most primitive of all priesthoods and the most fundamental of all sacrifices, the common meal of the family: always a religious act; most formally so on the eves of Sabbath and festival; and a complete Liturgy at the Passover.

It was from the Communion-Sacrifice of this common Meal of Religious Fellowship that the original Christian service took its source. The other phases of Jewish worship made some contributions to its form. Thus the Synagogue furnished the idea of Lessons of Scripture, Sermon, and comprehensive prayers of Intercession. The Temple supplied nothing to the Christian rite, save possibly the singing of Psalms. Indeed, the primary Christian records do not align the Eucharist with the Temple Sacrifices even in thought as a piacular rite; such expressions as "the blood of the Lamb," "the Lamb as it had been slain," being the poetic afterthoughts of a later age of reflection. Secondary likewise are the Pauline rationalizations of the Atonement itself in terms of immolation and propitiation; they are partial metaphors to illumine the deep mystery and paradox of the Passion.

In taking over the constituent elements of Jewish forms, in no case was matter adopted unchanged. At the most it was adapted to the requirements of a new religion working mightily with the released forces of its own vital *status nascendi*. Former fixed and solid forms were dissolved in the fervor of a new enthusiasm, and eventually recrystallized out in new patterns arranged in another order. But the precedents of elaborate liturgical forms, and of a solemn liturgical style of prayer, set a definite standard which determined the mold in which the Christian services were ultimately fixed.

From the first the practice of continual common worship was the unifying and constitutive factor of the Christian association. The Apostles were a "fellowship," a society to which others were admitted not only on the basis of a "teaching," but of a common life whose expression was "the breaking of the bread and the prayers" (Acts 2:42). The Church was precisely a "worshipping society," whose bond of unity lay in the liturgical act—"For we being many are one bread, and one body; for we are all partakers of that one bread" (1 Cor. 10:17). And we find the apostolic Church meeting *daily* for common acts of fellowship and worship (Acts 2:46).

4. THE AGE OF THE PERSECUTIONS

As we have intimated, the following three centuries, during which the Church was an outlawed association, had some marked effects on its character as a Worshipping Society. The actual Persecutions were intermittent, and all were local in scope until the attempt of Decius in 250 to extirpate Christianity throughout the Empire. Nevertheless, at no time during these three hundred years was it safe for any man to be a Christian. At any moment in any place the malice of a personal enemy might precipitate the choice between recantation and martyrdom. Nominal and lukewarm Christians did not exist. The "faithful" were exactly that—men and women of burning conviction.

A situation that kept triflers out drew those within to a particularly close fellowship. Eventually it drove the Church to become a secret society. In the middle of the second century this was not yet true; we find Justin naïvely describing the most sacred mysteries in the plainest language to the pagan Emperor. But after some experience of the potential perils from within, of weaker Christians who "lapsed" in the face of persecution and betrayed their brethren, the Church organized itself for self-defence, and walled itself about with the "Discipline of the Secret." In the earliest days converts had been baptized on the spot, upon expression of their faith and desire. By the beginning

of the third century, inquirers were instructed and tested over a novitiate which might last three years, before being finally "brought to light" of the central "mysteries" of Creed, Lord's Prayer, and Eucharistic Canon, in a long series of solemn liturgical functions which mark the prime origin, and still color the structure, of our season of Lent.

The precautions with which the Church surrounded itself, and its intense preoccupation with the essential activity of Worship, present characteristics perfectly exemplified in some lodges of the present day. In modern Masonry, for instance, the functions of the Fraternity to promote the fellowship and the edification of its members are strictly incidental to the performance of continual rituals whose object is the perpetuation of its corporate life, in the initiation of new members, and the installation of new officers. Masonry may be called primarily a Liturgical Society, exactly as the Church of the Persecutions was preoccupied with being a Worshipping Society. The Church had the heart and center of its life in the Eucharistic Feast, effecting directly those aims of fellowship and edification which are only faintly reflected in a lodge banquet or lecture. But along with the development and use of the Church's essential Liturgy stood two other rites, which may properly be called the Liturgy of Initiation and the Liturgy of Ordination, with an importance exactly analogous to their parallels in a modern secret order. The Church, intent on its own survival in the face of overwhelming difficulties, made a business of the rites of its worship.

5. THE CHURCH OF THE EMPIRE

In the fourth century the Church emerged from the shadow of peril, first as a permitted, eventually as an established religion. Churches were built; ceremonials rapidly elaborated to heights of spectacular splendor; by the end of the century the regional types of all the great Liturgies were fixed in their essence in the forms which they still retain. Interest in the cultus of the Church was intensified and dramatized by the competition of the

adherents of the theological controversies of the time. The precedents of the primordial Easter and Pentecost, and of the observance of the "birthdays" of the first Martyrs into life eternal, gave rise to the cardinal dates and seasons of the Christian Year, in which the faith of the Church is celebrated in an annual pageant of worship.

Yet this glorious formative fourth century contained the seeds of all the internal weaknesses which have beset the Church ever since. It has been said that in the triumph of Constantine it was a question whether the world was converted to the Church, or the Church to the world. A Church purified by fire became a Church of nominal Christians. The distinction between "venial" and "mortal" sins—once between those conceivably forgivable in a professed Christian, and those which without recourse marked the suicide of the soul—was softened down to a classification of small and great transgressions. The more absolute precepts of the Gospel were relegated to the category of "counsels of perfection," and their fulfillment frankly regarded as beyond the capacity of the layman. Those who still sought the attainment of evangelical perfection withdrew from the common life, first as eremites, then as *cœnobite* monks. And the continual practice of worship came to be regarded as the obligation of a special class, not the corporate business of the whole society.

The Church, sanctioned by the State, tended to become the tool of the State; its policies to degenerate into politics. The diverse racial strains, gathered into an unstable unity in the Empire, proved yet more unstable in the Church. The great schisms of the fifth century were much less the results of the conflict of theological theories than the expression of nascent nationalisms, and of an irresistible desire to have public worship conducted in a language "understood of the people."

The whole subsequent history of the Church as a Worshipping Society exemplifies the working out of all these inherent tensions. The same forces are contending today as those which vexed the early days of the Christian Empire.

6. ELABORATIONS OF WORSHIP

Though the fourth century fixed the form of the central prayers of the Eucharistic Rite, it marked no drying up of the living spring of devotional inspiration and liturgical creation. In the East, where the whole *Anaphora* was so fixed, this spirit of invention took the form of the composition of alternative *Anaphoræ*, in some rites in incredible numbers. In North Africa and the West, it expressed itself in an indefinite ringing of changes upon the themes of the constituent Collects, of which the fixed order and pattern of the service was composed. It was out of this rich store that probably the Ambrosian rite, followed by the Roman, made choice of a definite series of prayers to constitute an invariable "Canon."

Even after the Church of the West had thus "frozen" its service, and closed its books to anything but the "propers" of new festivals, liturgical invention went on unabated in the sphere of private devotions; and some of these ultimately received recognition as official liturgical features or services. Such were the subsidiary prayers and ceremonies of the Mass, which did not reach their present form and fixity until the thirteenth century. And such were the specializations, analyses, and dramatizations into separate rites and services of some of the elements, moments, and implications of the all-embracing worship of the Eucharistic Liturgy. Thus the liturgical Creed has been paraphrased into a personal "Act" in the formula, "Blessed be God"; the sermon converted into a joint debate in the popular Italian byplay of *Dotto ed Insipiente*; the Intercessions employed separately in the official Litany, and copied in a host of popular adaptations; the *Anamnesis* or Commemoration of the Passion extended to the Stations of the Cross, and the annual observance of the Three Hours on Good Friday; the high moment of the Elevation prolonged in the Exposition, Procession, and Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament, the festival of Corpus Christi, and the diocesan cycles of the celebration of the Forty Hours throughout the year.

Elaboration also went on unchecked in all other services of the Church. The Hours of Prayer were enormously expanded

in the East. It seems like irony to apply the term "Breviary" to a system of daily prayers which fills four volumes, one for each season of the year: yet the Western Offices have in fact been drastically abbreviated as compared with their former extension, and stand in marked contrast with the system of the Eastern Churches, where these services actually fill eight hours of the day—a requirement impossible to fulfil outside the cloister. The rites of Baptism, Confirmation, and Ordination were overloaded with subsidiary ceremonies until the knowledge was lost of what was essential to those Sacraments, and what was not, and until subsequent simplifications in some cases eliminated indispensable things. The Laying on of Hands, for example, exists doubtfully if at all in the present Roman rites of Confirmation and Ordination. Doubtless we should now be attacking the validity of Roman Orders, if we could do so without impeaching our own. Other rites, such as marriages and burials, attained similar complexities, inviting simplifications for the needs of a modern age.

7. THE PERIOD OF THE DEFORMATION

The Reformation of the sixteenth century would never have been necessary if the ninth and tenth centuries had not seen in the West a period of Deformation of some standards of primitive faith and practice from which the Orthodox East has never deviated.

The followers of the apostolic faith in the Eastern lands of its birth have never lost their grasp of the apostolic concept of the Church as Christ's mystical body, in which men are made members in baptism, and in which they are nurtured in a society united in eucharistic worship, whereby they are conformed and transfigured to the fulness of the stature of the Divine Humanity of the Lord, until they have been made fit for the heavenly Kingdom.

But where the Greek churches conceived the central reality of the Redemption of mankind as a dynamic process, the Latin mind interpreted it as a judicial act. The East considered "Salva-

tion" to be a transformation of human nature by the power of Christ to lift it above the possibility of sinning. The West lost sight of a rescue from sin, in preoccupation with escape from its consequences. Those consequences were regarded as automatic, inherent in the decrees of an inexorable Judge, whose justice knew only retribution, who demanded expiation by penal suffering—yet who could be appeased by a legal fiction, accepting the satisfaction of a vicarious atonement in the sacrifice of an innocent Victim for the sins of the whole world. The metaphors and analogies of the late apostolic age were frozen into the literalisms of a grim jurisprudence.

This legalistic, artificial, and morally shocking travesty of the character of the almighty and most merciful Father of mankind lay at the root of all the "deformation" of faith and worship in the West. Unhappily, the revolt against its consequences did not recognize it for what it was, a completely unethical system, and it remained unreformed at the Reformation.

The preoccupation with the problem of Sin caused a new use of the discipline of Penance and the rite of Absolution. The early Church had employed these as exceptional measures of last resort for the reconciliation of "open and notorious evil livers." The mediæval Church erected them into a Sacrament, and required their use by all persons as part of a normal Christian life. Proposed as remedies for sin, in practice they enervated conscience and dulled the recognition of the sinfulness of sin, by reducing all transgressions to a "venial" level; and while they impaired the stalwart self-responsibility of the Christian character, they greatly enhanced the pastoral authority of the official priesthood.

Even the gracious face of heaven was darkened by the threatening shadow of wrath to come. Grim theorists asserted as dogmatic fact the existence of an eternal hell of fire yawning for the impenitent; an equally unpleasant penitentiary annex of Purgatory, every bit as hot, where all redeemed sinners must work out the utmost farthing of the penalties assessed by relentless Justice for their repented *and forgiven* misdeeds done in the body;

and even a sort of Juvenile Detention Home in Limbo, where unbaptized infants played forever in a perfect natural happiness, though forever deprived of the Beatific Vision of God.

This grisly mythology cast a gloom over the primary Christian hope of immortality. For a thousand years the whole Church had celebrated in the white garments of joy the triumph of the ending of a Christian's earthly struggle, and his entrance upon the heavenly reward. Now the Western Church put on again the black vesture of pagan and Jewish mourning, and, amid the dreadful strains of the *Dies Irae*, returned to a heathen atmosphere of grief and terror.

The unchristian idea of Propitiation attacked the Eucharist itself, and transformed that great act of Thanksgiving into a rite to appease an offended God. Such is by no means the inherent meaning of the Roman service. To this day the Mass stands unaltered in what is one of the most primitive of liturgical forms. True, it is outstandingly sacrificial in color, hardly a constituent Collect in the Canon being untouched by the note of Oblation. But the underlying and expressed concept of Sacrifice in every detail is primeval: it is an offering of fruits of the earth to be the means of a divine communion.

Nevertheless a theology that explained the Atonement as a substitutionary Satisfaction had no misgivings in construing the Eucharist in terms of precisely those expiatory forms of Sacrifice from which it was *not* descended. Even those, as we have seen, were misinterpreted in the erroneous rendering of "the suffering of a victim, or the destruction of an offering." This was applied to mean that the needful outward ceremony of the Eucharistic Sacrifice was to be found in the consumption of the species in communion, but its inner reality must be sought in some factual identification of the Mass with the Offering upon Calvary. The theory of a ritual immolation of Christ, effecting a substantive Propitiatory Sacrifice in every Mass, was forced upon an ancient form of service which in itself can not possibly be construed to denote, to imply, or even to permit, anything of the kind.

With this interpretation, the old function of the Liturgy as the corporate act of the whole Church vanished in the West. In the East, the Liturgy may not be celebrated more than once a day upon any altar; and it is impossible to perform any Orthodox liturgy without at least three officiants, the Celebrant, a Deacon, and one man to take the part of the Choir. But the Latin Church invented the rite of Low Mass, and multiplied celebrations exceedingly, with only nominal regard to a congregation, and none at all to communions.

This sort of thing is definitely "sacerdotalism"—the usurpation by an official of the functions of the whole Worshipping Society; a maiming of worship by reducing the corporate participation of the people to the attendance of spectators. The worst of it was that the people accepted it, became habituated to it, and refused to be taught any different habits after the Reformation. The objective and remote attitude of modern Protestantism toward the exercises of public worship, and its reluctance to concern itself much with the Sacraments as vital realities and factors in personal religious life, probably find their roots in this characteristic of the mediæval Roman Church.

It is rather remarkable that this kind of worship-at-a-distance received as much allegiance of the people as it did in the Middle Ages. There were two good reasons for that. One is the sheer element of *mystery* in a rite performed in an ancient and hieratic tongue. This enabled ecclesiastics to exalt beyond all reason and distort beyond all recognition the thaumaturgic qualities of the Mass, in itself a ritual which we have seen to be very primitive, and which is in fact a most simple, commonplace, and almost completely unobjectionable Christian service. The Devonshire Rebels did not know that they were criticizing a very faithful and highly spiritual rendering of the Mass when they raised this objection to the First Prayerbook: "We will not receive the new service, because it is but like a Christmas game:" in other words, "Why, this stuff sounds just like a Nativity Play; anybody can understand it; where is our old Miracle of the Mass?"

The other reason—the reason why the common people of England generally attended not only the Mass, which was a drama, and did something, but also the daily offices of Matins and Evensong, which did nothing, but merely said things they did not understand—was the fact that they had little else to do. Indeed as recently as a hundred years ago the parish clergyman was either the only intelligent man, or the most intelligent man, in any village; and going to church was the only intellectual entertainment of the people. Modern civilization, which has filled the common life so full of *diversions*—which are quite literally “distractions”—has given the Church a vastly intensified competition from its ancient enemy “the world.”

8. THE ENGLISH REFORMATION

The Reformation in England had as its chief objective the recapturing of the congregational character of the worship of the Primitive Church, and the restoration of participation in worship from a sacerdotal monopoly to the use of the people. Cranmer interfered as little as possible with the actual content of the mediæval services. They were simplified, in some cases condensed—and correspondingly enriched,—and rendered into the mother tongue with a classic simplicity of eloquence far surpassing the crude originals; but everything essential was there. Cranmer hoped that the whole nation would come to church to say its daily prayers, as the priests and monks had once been required to do. He confidently expected that at least on Sundays and holydays all would join in a plenary “parish communion.”

But folk-habits are very resistant to change. The children of the newly enlightened age persisted in their mediæval customs. The daily Offices were fairly generally observed by the clergy in the parish churches, without ever being largely attended; and today they are a vanishing factor. And the Reformers' insistence upon the corporate character of the Eucharist unhappily took the form of forbidding its celebration unless a sufficient number had *previously* signified their intention to communicate. The rubrics which continually extended the substitute use of the “Ante-Com-

munion" in the successive Anglican books during the following ninety years show that it proved progressively impossible to assure such a celebration, with communions, in any parish even upon Sundays. The Holy Communion came to be employed, and even explained, as an "occasional office"; and eventually there came a span of more than a century during which it is doubtful if the average English parish saw the service four times a year.

This growing disuse of the Communion produced a compensating enrichment of the orders of Morning and Evening Prayer. Hitherto, the Eucharistic Liturgy was the only perfectly complete form of public worship which the Christian Church had ever known. The original order of Morning Prayer corresponded only to the Liturgy's preliminary portion, the *Pro-Anaphora*; from which indeed it had ultimately been derived. And as Morning Prayer effectively supplanted the Eucharist as the chief common worship of the Church, a sound liturgical instinct caused it to be filled up with the missing elements of devotion, after the pattern of the comprehensive Liturgy. The content of the Offices in 1549 consisted only of Scripture, Creed, praise, and the briefest of prayers. To this were added successively an act of penitence, in the Confession and Absolution; a complete cycle of general Intercessions; and the definite "eucharistic" note of the General Thanksgiving. And to this, custom appended a Sermon, an act of Oblation, and a sacerdotal Benediction.

The resultant form is still predominantly the chief service of an ordinary Sunday throughout the Anglican communion. Intellectually, it is a complete service. Its defect is that it is chiefly intellectual. It is a form of words, not an action; it does nothing. Its ceremonial is spurious (for imitatively it has attracted a good deal of ceremonial): since its processions and recessions, its movements of the officiant to lectern, pulpit, and altar, its up-risings and down-sittings, its imposing climax of the "elevation of the cash," all accomplish nothing more than those complicated evolutions so painstakingly practiced at the rehearsal of a wedding. Morning Prayer, so rich with thoughts for the thoughtful,

proves formal and prosy to the generality of mankind. As far as acts of man can go, it paraphrases the content of the Liturgy; but it contains no act of God. Compared with the essential drama of the Liturgy, it is as little vital as a prose synopsis of an acted play.

9. THE NON-LITURGICAL CHURCHES

This sort of outcome by no means proves that the Anglican Church made a mistake in preserving the old inheritance of liturgical worship. The non-liturgical churches by a different road arrived at exactly the same situation. All the Reformation Churches had the same ideal of the Church as a Worshipping Society. Unhappily, all were to some degree and for varying reasons somewhat *afraid of the Sacraments*, or at least of mediæval beliefs and practices of them; and all succeeded in safeguarding them nearly out of existence. The experience of the great Greek and Latin communions is that the Eucharist alone is adequate as a center of the Church's devotions. And wherever, as in England and Prussia, the Reformation churches swept the field clear of all competition, they found that their somewhat negative attitude toward the Eucharist left them without effective power to change the devotional habits of nations from the evil inheritance of the Middle Ages.

With regard to the content of common worship, the non-liturgical churches have contributed nothing. They reverted to the Primitive Church's "freedom of prayer," with much emphasis on the exercise of the "gift of prayer," and arrogantly modest allusions to the "power of the Spirit." Most curiously, in every case they made the conduct of public worship more of a clerical monopoly, with less of congregational participation, than the English or the mediæval Church. Of course the explanation is that public worship must be fixed and liturgical, in order to *be* congregational. A solo may be an improvisation; but a chorus must have a hymn-book. So it is impossible to have common prayers without a Book of Common Prayer!

Now the "gift of prayer" exists—exceptionally;—and at times it has been most nobly and inspiringly employed. But one trouble with an exclusively *extempore* order of service is that it is as ephemeral as the daily newspaper. If the "Free Churches" had anything of permanent value to contribute to Christian worship, they ought by this time to have evolved their own Liturgies. They have had 400 years to do it in; which was all the time the Primitive Church needed for that task. They do indeed show an increasing sense of the need and value of liturgical forms; but the best of their efforts so far have displayed only the reshuffling of material eclectically borrowed from the devotional wealth of the historic Church.

10. THE MODERN SITUATION

Within the last century, American Protestantism saw the completion of a process which had long been gathering force. It was commonly thought of as the decline of Calvinism. Actually, it was something far more fundamental: it was the long overdue extinction of belief in the mediæval conception of God and theology of the Atonement which lay at the root of all the abuses of the Western Church. Quietly as it came about, it was a theological revolution. It was the completion of the Reformation: more, it was the only real Reformation, since it struck at causes where the sixteenth century had tried to remedy symptoms.

America today still has an unreformed party of self-named "Fundamentalists" who cling stubbornly to the worst literalisms and legalities of the Middle Ages. But all our enlightened and liberal Protestants have come to an interpretation of the Christian faith which is in accord with the Primitive Church, and the undeviating tradition of the Orthodox East. We believe in a God of love, not of wrath; in future punishment which is corrective, not vindictive; in a reconciliation of man to God, not a propitiation of God toward man; in prayer which uplifts man to be the coworker of God, not a piece of magic to change the order of the universe. All this is an inexpressible sublimation of the basic

concepts of religion, and implies a corresponding refinement of the motives and practice of worship.

The results in that respect have been disappointing hitherto. The new liberty of the sons of God has to some degree loosed some ancient sanctions, and appreciably impaired the cohesion of the Worshipping Society, already hard beset by the increasing pressure of the World without. It is unfortunately true that imperfectly redeemed human nature finds Love a much less potent motive than Fear. Certainly men are easier to drive than to lead. "Hell," said a noted wit, "was once the central heating plant of the Protestant churches." And there can be no mistaking the fact that their temperature has decidedly cooled off since the dreadful fires of the Pit have sunk to obscurity. A prelate of the Church recently said, "We must find a new *rationale* for our efforts. What do we think we are doing in the Church? Saving men from damnation? No modern man believes he could be damned if he wanted to be!"

Such an assertion would horrify an heir of the Western tradition of a legalistic God. An Anglican is unperturbed. He recognizes that the statement is in conflict with some beliefs formerly held in his Church; but he knows that it is not in conflict with the religion of the Prayer Book.

It is a remarkable fact that the Second Reformation was almost completely anticipated in the liturgical work of Cranmer. He himself was thoroughly imbued with the theological misapprehensions of his time. But he kept very close to his Latin sources, which, as we have seen, were innocent in themselves of all the eisegesis forced upon them. We must feel it was providential that he was almost completely preserved from putting mediæval interpretations into the services. "Satisfaction," and "provoking most justly thy wrath and indignation against us," probably mark the full extent of such infiltrations. And his contact with the Greek Liturgies was a far more important matter than the conflation of a few phrases into his text. He was profoundly influenced by their spirit, and perfectly interpreted their primitive

faith in a dynamic religion, conforming human nature to its pattern and perfection in Christ.

Thus a new force was given the Baptismal Office by incorporating in the last prayer St Basil's version of the Pauline concept of a rebirth into the power of Christ's risen life. The new "Form" of the rite of Confirmation embodies an idea which has had little liturgical expression since the highly evangelical work of Serapion: that the grace conferred is not a static once-for-all possession, but a dynamic means of continuous growth and progress: that we may "*daily increase* in the Holy Spirit more and more." The text of the Eucharist is edited in eloquent paraphrases to remove the last conceivable interpretations of it as a rite of propitiation; and Eastern influences are manifest in the glowing passages which restore its glorious character as the Church's great corporate act of Thanksgiving. Its consecration is explicitly, following St Basil's Liturgy, by the Holy Spirit, not by human priesthood or magic words; and its objective is made clear as not a ritual immolation—much less the creation of a thaumaturgic cult-object—but again as a dynamic transformation of the Christian soul through most intimate contact with its Lord: "that our sinful bodies may be made clean by his body, and our souls washed through his most precious blood, and that we may evermore dwell in him, and he in us." The whole force of the forms for Confession and Absolution is not the mere remission of past guilt, but an enabling to future righteousness of life. The state of the faithful departed is presented as a life of progress in the fellowship of the Saints, and a perfecting in the Mystical Body of Christ.

It is perhaps the greatest of Anglican inheritances that these conceptions of life and growth are woven into the warp and woof of our rituals. As a consequence, throughout its history our Church has been a quiet forerunner of the modern twice-reformed religion, in upholding a life of nurture, and exemplifying a profoundly ethical and workable Christianity. Its weakness has been the neglect of the full practice of the system of worship which has taught it these things. It is characteristic that

Pelagianism was the sole heresy of British origin. And our racial self-confidence has too often expressed itself in thinking that works are enough, without much reference to faith, and that character can be cultivated without the continual renewal of the inspirations of worship.

Yet it is the religion of the Book of Common Prayer that has saved our Church from the gates of the grave, and raised it again from the dead. In the eighteenth century Anglicanism was a bankrupt national sect, shadowed by the last penumbra of the Dark Ages, weak with its own indecisions, invaded by an extrinsic Calvinism, in Erastian bondage to the State. By the potent forces of the century-old revival of its own functions as a Worshipping Society it has been reborn as an ecumenical communion; it is the power of that worship that has armed it with new energies for the conquest of the world.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

By SHERMAN E. JOHNSON,

Nashotah House, Nashotah, Wisconsin

I am convinced by the contention of Prof. A. T. Olmstead, in his "Intertestamental Studies," *JAOS* LVI (1936) 242-257, and his unpublished "History of New Testament Times in Palestine," which he has kindly allowed me to consult, that the nucleus of our First Enoch is the Aramaic Fall of the Watchers (Enoch 6; 7; 8:2 f; 10:9-12), and that this dates from before the time of Antiochus Epiphanes. But just why did the story of the Watchers appeal to pious Jews of this period? I suggest that it may have symbolized for them the fall of the Jews ("sons of God") into the harlotry of Hellenistic culture. Already in Sirach 45:5-13 we have the sage inveighing against Hellenizers, and the earlier story of the Watchers would have been homiletically valuable to the strict party. Just as in the case of the Watchers and mortal women the offspring of miscegenation brought woes on the world, so would the miscegenation between Jewish and Hellenistic culture.

Another question might be asked. Jubilees and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs date alike from the time of John Hyrcanus. There are certain resemblances between the two. Just how did Jubilees come to be written in this form? It is not too much to assume, in my opinion, that it was the Testaments which suggested to our author's mind the rewriting of the whole of Genesis. This hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that some of the midrash which is very vivid in the Testaments, e.g. the prophecy of Levi's high-priesthood, the story of Joseph and Potiphar's wife, and the detailed account of Dinah's ravishment, occurs also in Jubilees in less vivid form. That is what usually happens in a secondary writing; contrast the sections in Jude and Second Peter which parallel each other.

S. E. J.

In the *Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* XXXVII (1938) 211-214, T. C. Skeat argues from the evidence of a papyrus (Pap. Oxy. iv. 165) and the probably original reading of Sinaiticus that the *pōs auxanousin* (how they grow) of Matt. 6:28 should be *pōs ou xainousin* (how they card not). The corruption, he thinks, took place at a very early date, before either Matthew or Luke were written; in other words, it belongs to the textual history of Q.

A. H. F.

It has long been recognized that at least part of Rev. 12 is to be dated about the time of the Jewish War. J. Weiss, in *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, vol. II, part 3, pp. 128-134, thought, however, that the final author in the time of Domitian used two independent documents, a John-apocalypse (J) and an old Jewish source (Q). I do not doubt that there are pre-Christian Jewish elements here, and even behind them pagan elements (e.g. the Leto story), but it seems to me more likely that chap. 12 as a whole is a Christian apocalypse of about the year 70 which uses old Jewish elements. The woman is the true Israel, now revealed as the Christian Church. This, rather than Mark 13, may be the oracle referred to by Eusebius, *H. E.* iii. 5. 3, which ordered the Jerusalem Christians to "depart from the city before the war, and to inhabit a certain city of Perea." Mark 13 may, of course, have been a factor here, but in its original form it was an oracle delivered, not to meet the situation in 66 or 67, but in A.D. 40. These considerations suggest that a new study of early Christian apocalyptic is needed. No history of primitive Christianity has yet been written which uses the apocalyptic material to the full.

S. E. J.

BOOK REVIEWS

Exodus. By Georg Beer; with a Contribution by Kurt Galling. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1939, pp. 179. RM 7.60; bound, 9.40.

This commentary is the third in the first series of the *Handbuch zum Alten Testament*, edited by Eissfeldt. It follows the usual plan of the series, giving for each section of the text an original translation, with letters indicating the source to which each element is assigned by the author; a critical apparatus; a discussion of the source-analysis; and the commentary proper. In his analysis of the sources the author goes into extreme detail, breaking the text up into portions, often extremely minute, of J¹, J², E, E¹, P, E², J³, R, RJE, RD, RP, (RD) RP; the result being a mosaic which most readers will accept with less confidence than the author feels in putting it forth. Mosaics of this sort are the fashion, and so probably a necessity, for which the commentator should not be held entirely responsible. The critical apparatus is brief and helpful. The chief value of the book, however, is to be found in the commentary itself, which sets forth in rapid but sufficient fashion the meaning of the traditions embodied in each section, illuminating them by illustrations drawn from archaeology, comparative religion and other pertinent sources, and discussing them with a clarity that makes easy reading.

As is to be expected in a commentary on Exodus, the author is continually giving his estimate of the historicity of the traditions; and here he displays a sound historical sense, recognizing freely their legendary character yet insisting that they contain a historical core. His reconstruction of the main outlines of the history is as follows: The Israelites were actually enslaved by the Egyptians (p. 17). Moses was born in Egypt, of the tribe of Joseph (p. 21), migrated to Midian (p. 23), where he may well have married into the family of a Midianitish *patronus* (p. 24). He met Yahweh in Sinai (which Beer places near Kadesh) and as a result returned to Egypt with the conviction that Israel would be delivered from its bondage and that he was called to carry out the work of liberation (p. 33). "After an uprising of the (Israelitish) workers and futile negotiations with the court had proved fruitless, the Israelites succeeded in outwitting the king and escaping during an outbreak of pestilence. . . . Pharaoh purposed to recapture the fugitives. His force suffered a disaster at the Sorbonic Lake (Red Sea). Under the leadership of Moses the Israelites pressed on to Kadesh" (p. 79). At Sinai and in Kadesh they swore faithfulness to Yahweh. He became the highest authority over all the areas of Israel's life. The covenant with Him obligated them to worship Him exclusively, to obey His call to war, and to accept His judicial decisions. Later this group of Israelites, having settled in Palestine, extended Yahweh's domain to all twelve tribes, including the groups which at the time of Moses did not yet belong to the Yahweh league (p. 163).

This brief outline is enough to show that the author reconstructs history along judicious lines. For Moses and his work he has the highest regard. In Moses he sees the creator of the national religion of Israel (p. 33), animated by social passion (p. 22 f), and clothed with mysterious power. "It is the duty of the more illuminated understanding to point out the natural basis of the legends and miracle-stories regarding Moses; but in the end it also must capitulate and acknowledge that as with the other founders of religions, so with Moses also, an unexplainable great something entered into his life and work" (p. 35).

After reading such a comment one is not surprised to find that a genuine religious tone pervades the whole commentary.

FLEMING JAMES.

The Message of Jesus Christ. By Martin Dibelius. Translated by Frederick C. Grant. New York: Scribner's, 1939, pp. xx + 192. \$2.00.

The average reader will find Form Criticism much more understandable when approached through Professor Dibelius' *Message*, with its actual treatment of gospel pericopes, than when studied in one of the many handbooks now dealing with the subject. The present translation is a fine one, much better than *From Tradition to Gospel*. In the original, Dibelius sought to carry over the Greek flavor of the gospel sections into idiomatic German; as he says (p. xviii), "I have renounced both aims, that of precise literalness and that of a unified Biblical style. The different sections ought to sound differently." Dr. Grant, who is equipped with a fine feeling for Greek, German and English, has in turn been able to bring this over into the translation. For example, the evil spirit of Mark 1:26 "roared loudly." They call to Bartimaeus, "Come, cheer up, he is calling you" (Mark 10:49). "Stop making my Father's house into a bazaar" (John 2:16). "Justified" in Luke 18:14 becomes "at peace with God." In the parable of the dragnet, Matt. 13:48, "the good ones they toss into the tub, the bad they throw away." Certainly someone ought to do a translation of the whole New Testament in which the differences of style, e.g. between Mark and Luke, would be apparent.

Dr Grant reviewed *Die Botschaft* in the *ATR*, vol. XVIII (1936), pp. 102 f. The present reviewer would content himself with two points. (1) The form-critical method is undoubtedly sound, as most students now agree, but it can become a bit forced. Dibelius thinks that the mention of the sons of Zebedee in Mark 10:35-45 was added to the tradition. Can it not be that *sometimes* names were remembered in paradigms? Must every paradigm be forced into the form-critical scheme? (2) Dibelius suggests that Mark 10:26 f, with its appeal to scripture, is added to the original paradigm; an attractive suggestion.

SHERMAN E. JOHNSON.

Organic Thinking: a Study in Rabbinic Thought. By Max Kadushin. New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1938, pp. xvi + 397, including an appendix, notes and two indices. \$3.00.

The fundamental thesis of the author, which also underlies his previous volume, *Theology of Seder Eliahu*, is that "social values and ideals cannot be

coordinated into a *logical system*"; for such a system necessarily takes no account of the differences between individuals, nor of the uniqueness of every ethical situation, and so "runs counter to all the forms and factors that make the human scene human" (p. v). They require instead what the author calls an *organic system*, in which all concepts exist in their own right and yet are parts of a complex living whole, forming a "clearly discernible pattern" which is firm enough to supply the necessary cohesion and yet remains "remarkably elastic, even fluid" (p. vi). That man's mental life and his concepts must possess an organic aspect is suggested by the fact that his body and his psychological constitution are also organismic.

Such a theory of organic thinking proves specially helpful in the study of religion. Indeed, it is by his analysis of a certain tract of religious thinking—the rabbinic literary material—that the author finds proof that organic thinking is a "genuine phenomenon, not an artifact" (p. vi). He confines his study to a single rabbinic text, the haggadic midrashim *Seder Eliahu Rabba* and *Seder Eliahu Zuta*, which present all the chief rabbinic concepts in living unity. "There are," writes the author in a brief introductory chapter, "four fundamental concepts in rabbinic theology—God's loving-kindness, His justice, Torah, and Israel" (p. 6). Other concepts are just as important, but these are fundamental "because all the rabbinic concepts are built, woven together, out of these four." This integration the author demonstrates in a detailed treatment of the Torah, dealing in ch. ii with the Torah in general and in ch. iii with the Torah as Law and Ethics (including *miswoth*, Good Deeds, *Derek Erez*, charity, Deeds of Loving-kindness, and the ethical dicta). These two chapters, which comprise the central section of the book (161 pages), exhibit the striking nobility of rabbinic thought, and are full of illumination for the non-Jewish reader.

In ch. iv he uses the material thus gathered as a basis for setting forth at length his picture of what he calls the "organic complex." It is made up of "organic concepts," which he defines (p. 184) as parts of "a whole complex of concepts none of which can be inferred from the others but all of which are so mutually interrelated that every individual concept, though possessing its own distinctive features, nevertheless depends for its character on the character of the complexes as a whole which, in turn, depends on the character of the individual concepts. Each organic concept, therefore, implicates the whole complex without being completely descriptive of the complex, retaining, at the same time, its own distinctive features." Hence rabbinic theology is not a theology in the sense of being "the theory behind creeds or dogmas, a logical system of ideas and concepts having a hierarchical relation to one another" (p. 185), but "is rather a net-work of concepts."

These concepts always embody themselves in concrete situations, yet are never lost sight of, on the one hand interpreting the situation, and on the other impelling those who hold them to give them concrete expression in their own lives. They do not operate singly, but several combine in each situation. They combine because they possess a potential simultaneity. "It is as if the whole complex were constantly a trigger-point, ready to pour forth *all* its concepts on any occasion or situation" (p. 94). Hence arise paradoxes, since a situa-

tion may be determined by several concepts at once. Nor in a given situation does every individual combine them in the same way.

All this is very different from logical thinking; and yet logical thinking has full play *within the frame-work* of the organic complex. Indeed, the Rabbis may justly be criticized for the dry strictness of their logic. The organic complex also acts as a frame-work for folk-tales on biblical themes; and the Rabbis, who were after all of the people, used these naturally. In respect to the Bible, rabbinic theology is really a new organic complex; for though its concepts are all either found or adumbrated in the Bible to some extent, yet the organic whole formed by them is not biblical.

Though they had no all-inclusive God-concept, the Rabbis enjoyed a profound experience of God, which heightened their awareness of self. It had nothing in common with later Jewish philosophy, but was rather a *normal* mysticism of the sort possible for the plain man. And it was involved in ethics, the practice of the *Derek Eres*. To the sphere of the ethical they devoted much painstaking, logical thought.

"Is organic thinking a phenomenon of modern times?" the author asks (p. 254); and he answers that in view of the overwhelming importance of society further investigation should be made to discover whether such thinking is not an "abiding feature of men's mental life." He raises a final question (p. 261). If rabbinic theology in its interpretation of the Bible produced a new organic complex on a new level, may not rabbinic theology in turn be so re-interpreted today as to create an equally new complex?

FLEMING JAMES.

The Privilege of Age. By Vida Scudder. New York: Dutton, 1939, pp. 319. \$3.50.

Vida Scudder is a female William Lyon Phelps—for years a distinguished teacher of English (at Wellesley), for years a popular essayist on subjects secular and spiritual, for years a lay-preacher of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Of course there are differences. Phelps is a Baptist, Scudder an Episcopalian; Phelps is more modern, Scudder more mediæval; Phelps is gay with the gaiety of a New Haven undergraduate, Scudder's gaiety is that of a genuine Franciscan. Nevertheless there are indisputable likenesses. They both have a rich academic background which hasn't issued in pedantry; they both love to write and do it well; they both are growing old but seem to enjoy it enormously.

"This is a book of old age," Miss Scudder says in the introduction to these essays, "and it has a painfully dull title. What I really want to call it, but I dare not, is: 'Thought Marches On.'"

And so it does. She wrote the title essay for the *Atlantic* in 1933, and most of the other essays are likewise reprints from contributions to journals and magazines during the years since 1913. To all of the original publishers we are indebted for the permission given to bring together in one convenient volume these twenty essays which furnish "illustrations of the strange behaviour of twentieth century minds."

The invitation to purchase this admirable book lies in the seductive titles of the essays which more than live up to the promise of their themes. Plato as a Novelist, A Little Tour in the Mind of Lenin, Academic Freedom, The Doubting Pacifist, Mysticism and Social Passion, Thanksgiving in Hard Times, The Art of Corporate Adoration, The Cross in Utopia—these are a few of them. Attractive, aren't they?

And each of these as reprinted is prefaced by a delightful note which explains the why and wherefore of their writing, often with a twinkling humorous comment on the essay as seen from the writer's privilege of older age.

As for the initial essay on *The Privilege of Old Age*, it alone is worth the price of the book. "I am to my own bewildered amusement actually seventy years old (now seventy-five!) and I must find a new orientation of life. . . . I enjoy being old far more than I ever enjoyed being young. I feel so much more alive!"

These essays are alive, and the life behind and within them is the life of a noble churchwoman who for many years had been a constructive force in our American life and who now at five and seventy is still alert, thinking hard, safe from cynicism and full of joy, with plenty of time to savour her experience without being pursued by the "porpoise close behind us treading on the tail."

GEO. CRAIG STEWART.

NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

The Complete Bible. An American Translation. Chicago University Press, 1939, pp. 247. \$3.00.

The King James Bible, as Dr Goodspeed has said, is not now the King James Bible because it does not contain the Apocrypha which was a part of the Bible of 1611; hence this book, because it contains the Apocrypha, is called *The Complete Bible*. The Old Testament is the translation of Dr J. M. P. Smith and others which was published in 1931 (revised later by Dr T. J. Meek); along with this is Dr Goodspeed's translation of the New Testament; and to these has been added Dr Goodspeed's translation of the Apocrypha published in 1938.

A. H. F.

Isaias. Edidit Joseph Ziegler. Septuaginta: Vetus Testamentum Graecum. Auctoritate Societatis Litterarum Göttingensis editum. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1939, pp. 370. RM 24.15.

This is vol. XIV of the Göttingen Septuagint. The Psalms and I Maccabees have already appeared, the other Books of the Maccabees are to come next and then the XII Prophets. An Introduction of 121 pages gives a detailed account of the manuscripts. "Q (the codex Marchalianus) is the best witness for the old Isaiah text" (p. 29). The Chester Beatty Papyri give further evidence that the B (Codex Vaticanus) text of Isaiah is not a good one (p. 34). In addition to the regular critical apparatus at the foot of each page, a second one is provided giving the Hexapla material, including the readings of the later translators, Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion. This is undoubtedly the most complete critical edition of Isaiah in the Greek Bible that there is.

A. H. F.

The Book of Books. The New Testament Complete and Unabridged. A Translation in Modern Paragraph Form. London: R.T.S. The Lutterworth Press, 1938, pp. xii + 632. 2/6.

This translation is issued by The United Society for Christian Literature and has been supervised by a number of eminent Biblical scholars. It attempts to preserve the cadence and rhythm of the Authorised Version while making necessary changes and corrections. Coinage, weights and measures are left in the original, e.g. denarii not pence or shillings; poetry and Old Testament quotations are printed in italics; a short introduction is provided for each book. It is edited in modern style: for instance the last twelve verses of St Mark are headed, 'Appendix to Mark. An Epitome.' The book would be very suitable as a prize or Confirmation gift.

A. H. F.

The Story of Christ and the Early Church. By W. K. Lowther Clarke. New York: Macmillan, 1939, pp. 336. \$1.50.

Dr Lowther Clarke has prepared a "shorter New Testament" for use in religious education, in twelve parts. The first includes the infancy narratives, the next three parts from the synoptics, the fifth a number of parables, etc., concluding with life and faith in the apostolic Church. The various parts can be purchased separately at a low price.

The book is attractively printed, the text is that of the A.V. with an occasional introductory or explanatory note, there are good maps and attractive pictures, mostly modern but including facsimiles of a coin of Tiberius and the barrier inscription of the Temple.

The viewpoint is conservatively critical. Matthew tells the birth story from Joseph's point of view, Luke from that of the Virgin Mary. Mark 1: 32-34 and parallels are used to illustrate the priority of Mark. Papias' "logia" are Q, which perhaps goes back ultimately to St Matthew. The sources L and M are adopted, and some material is marked P (Petrine material lying back of Mark). The Last Supper is the Kiddush, not the Passover. "We do not always know when Jesus is supposed to be speaking and when St John is giving His teaching in his own words" (p. 175). John 21 is an afterthought; the "we" are the elders of Ephesus.

Only those who hold pre-critical views need hesitate to use this book. It should prove useful in teaching children of public school age. S. E. J.

The Orthodox Liturgy . . . according to the use of the Church of Russia. London: S. P. C. K.; New York: Macmillan, 1939, pp. xiv + 110. \$1.00.

This new translation from the Old Slavonic service-books is sponsored by the Fellowship of SS. Alban and Sergius—which should be a sufficient guarantee of its excellence. In addition to the Liturgies of St John Chrysostom and of St Basil, it prints the Office of the Prothesis (*Proskomidia*) and the form used in preparation for Communion. The little book is attractive in format and typography, with the audible parts of the service easily distinguishable from those said *mystikōs*. There is a clear and simple introduction.

P. V. N.

John Wesleys Lehre von der Heiligung. By Percy Scott. Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann (*Studien zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantismus, Heft 17*) 1939, pp. xii + 97. RM 5.50.

A Marburg dissertation by an English Methodist student, attempting to trace the religious development of Wesley's characteristic doctrine of Sanctification, and to find a way of reconciling this with the equally characteristic Lutheran doctrine of Justification *sola fide*. The reconciliation is sought and found in the pietistic strain in Lutheran theology. It is an interesting example of the sort of spadework that will have to be done repeatedly before our ecumenical ideals can become a reality.

P. V. N.

George W. Truett. A Biography. By P. W. James. New York: Macmillan, 1939, pp. 277. \$2.50.

This is the story of a great rugged Christian personality, written by his son-in-law. It is intimate, laudatory, and interesting. George Truett is without question one of the greatest preachers of our day, a man greatly beloved, not only in Texas where in Dallas during more than forty years he has built up a vast congregation of thousands, and not only among the Baptists of whose World Alliance he is President, but among all sorts and conditions of men. He came from the rugged mountains of North Carolina in his youth and took deep root in the fertile soil of Texas. His influence, as his biographer says, "now girdles the globe." Seldom does a living man have such a biography published. More seldom perhaps is such a biography well done by a son-in-law.

Of illustrations there are fifteen or twenty. An introduction is furnished by Douglas Southall Freeman who unfortunately begins his first sentence with words that would greatly offend the late Arthur Quiller-Couch: "In the case of Dr George W. Truett." "What do you mean by *case*?" Q would have asked. "A coffin?"

Clergy will enjoy especially the passages on the preaching techniques of this great evangelist.

G. C. S.

Fear and Trembling. By Søren Kierkegaard. Translated from the Danish by Robert Payne. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939, pp. 192. \$2.50.

Those whose theology is summed up in *credo quia absurdum* will revel in this masterpiece of Kierkegaard now first translated into English. The story is built about Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac. According to ethical standards Abraham was a murderer; but he was justified by his faith. Thus one gets to the heart of Kierkegaard's dialectic, the paradox of faith, the expression of the individual, versus ethics, the expression of the universal. In the tribulation of his temptation Abraham had the courage to perform 'in fear and trembling' the utter absurdity of faith. Whether one is convinced or not of the irrationality of religious faith, one will not lay aside this powerful presentation once begun. *Fear and Trembling* was completed in 1843 under the pseudonym of Johannes de Silentio. Kierkegaard considered it one of his best, though it is one of his briefest works. Between the lines one will read much of his own justification of his relations with his fiancée, Regine Olsen.

M. H. S., JR.

"I was in Prison": The Suppressed Letters of German Pastors. By Charles S. McFarland. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1939, pp. 112. \$1.00.

The major part of this book consists of excerpts from the letters of anonymous German pastors who have been imprisoned for their refusal to submit to State control of their teaching and preaching. The balance of the book is the author's interpretation of those letters and of the religious situation in Germany. Two impressions persist from a reading of the letters. The first is an assurance

of the indestructibility of German Christianity. The second is a rather disquieting question as to what one's own behavior would be in the face of similar testing.

F. R. M.

A Rabbi Teaches: A Collection of Addresses and Sermons. By Herman Hailperin. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1939, pp. viii + 171. \$2.00.

A dozen good sermons and addresses, simple, clearcut, tolerant, sympathetic and well written, plus five exceedingly interesting and informative lectures on Maimonides whom the author calls the Jewish Aquinas.

F. R. M.

Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament. Ed. by Gerhard Kittel. Vol. iv. Lfg. 9: *marturion-memphomai*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1939, pp. 513-576. Subsc. price, RM 2.90.

This installment of the TWNT and the fourth installment of Bultmann's new commentary on John (in the Meyer series) were about the last things to come through before the war broke out. We sincerely hope that the war may not interrupt the continuance of TWNT, which is one of our most valuable aids to NT exegesis; and that the commentary by Bultmann may also continue to appear—though it has been so greatly delayed that wars could be lost and won during the intervals between its installments!

The present signatures of vol. iv complete the article on *martus* and its cognates and contain a dozen other articles, among them *mastigōs*, *mataios*, *machaira*, *Melchisedek*—not words of crucial significance, but nevertheless important.

F. C. G.

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EDITED BY

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VOLUME XXI OCTOBER, 1939 NUMBER 4

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PUBLISHED BY

ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

600 HAVEN STREET
EVANSTON, ILLINOIS

PRINCE AND LEMON STS.
LANCASTER, PENNSYLVANIA

\$1.00 A NUMBER

\$3.00 A YEAR

Anglican Theological Review

VOLUME XXI

OCTOBER, 1939

NUMBER 4

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The REVIEW is published four times a year, as follows: Winter, Spring, Summer, and Autumn numbers. Subscription price \$3.00 annually. Single copies, \$1.00.

All editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to the Editor, the Rev. Frederick C. Grant, 3041 Broadway, New York City.

Subscriptions should be sent to the Treasurer, the Rev. Percy V. Norwood, 600 Haven Street, Evanston, Illinois.

Books for review should be sent to the Book Review Editor, the Rev. A. H. Forster, 600 Haven Street, Evanston, Illinois.

Entered as second-class matter, August 8, 1931, at the post-office at Evanston, Illinois, under the act of March 3, 1879; with additional entry at the post-office at Lancaster, Pennsylvania.

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